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SUMMARY
PEACEMAKING EFFORTS OF AFGHANS AND SYRIANS IN NRW AND GERMANY  \ E. MEININGHAUS & K. MIELKE  
For several decades now, Germany has become home to significant numbers of 
Afghans, and more recently Syrians, who have fled war. In this Working Paper, 
we analyse the political engagement for peace by Afghans and Syrians in Ger-
many since the beginning of violent conflict in Afghanistan (1978) and Syria 
(2011). Departing from an understanding of peace processes as more than 
summits and diplomatic events, we focus on peacemaking initiatives ‘from 
below’ by Afghans and Syrians in Germany, with a particular emphasis on  
activities in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), in a long-term perspective.  
As a guiding research question for this Paper, we ask: To what extent have  
Afghans and Syrians in NRW and other parts of Germany been able to engage 
in peacemaking, and how are these efforts linked to official talks and the  
situation inside Afghanistan and Syria?  
We argue that the different types of engagement we give evidence of, for  
instance, rallies, publications, the establishment of associations and even  
privately initiated dialogue forums for peace, constitute significant building 
blocks in peace processes. They demonstrate the agency of individuals and 
groups of Afghan and Syrian background to engage for peace and the potential 
impact they could have if acknowledged more widely. However, the same  
individuals and initiatives are usually excluded from official negotiations. In 
NRW, Königswinter near Bonn hosted the UN-Talks on Afghanistan in 2001, 
but only few representatives of Afghans in Germany were invited to participate. 
Similarly, the state of NRW, and Germany as a whole, are home to the highest 
number of Syrian refugees in Europe, yet hardly any individuals have been 
part of the Syria negotiations in Geneva.  
Our research highlights how history writing and research have sidelined  
organically emerging initiatives for peace from among societies facing war—
including among those living abroad. The evidence in this Paper, however, 
demonstrates that bottom-up engagement of exiles has initiated activities 
from the grassroots to the highest level, that is comparable to official Track 1 
talks that comprise representatives of the major armed factions of a conflict. 
In conclusion, we argue that such Afghan- and Syrian-led initiatives should 
receive significantly more scholarly attention and that their consideration 
will likely change the history writing of war and peace with a much clearer 
emphasis on the perspective of those who are concerned the most. 
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The sidelining of Afghans and Syrians  
in Germany in official peace processes 
(although here, both communities are 
strongest in Europe) resulted not only 
from the disconnect between official 
processes and ‘initiatives from below’ 
but also reflects existing high degrees 
of mistrust among members of the 
Syrian and Afghan community in  
Germany (and Europe) respectively. 
Both groups, Syrians and Afghans in Germany 
and NRW are not homogeneous but diverse in multi-
ple ways: Political worldview, generation, gender,  
socio-economic status and class background, etc.  
The analysis of Afghans’ and Syrians’ political  
engagement shows the difficulties to bridge political 
differences for joint action and to mobilise constitu-
encies for the necessary impact to influence German 
politicians and foreign policy.      
The experiences of political engagement 
by Afghans and Syrians differ regarding 
the liberties they are able to enjoy in 
Germany.
This is despite the fact that Germany provides a 
context where freedom of movement, expression and 
assembly are granted in society. While Afghans were 
able to engage for peace in Germany comparatively 
free of threats for persecution or blockage for non- 
return, fear dominates among Syrians. This fear  
remains strong as the regime and its police state 
structures remain in place. Since countless instances 
of intimidation and arrests of those politically active 
abroad and their families in Syria have been docu-
mented, Syrians mostly refrain from open political 
engagement for change in their country. 
A focus on peace processes, as opposed 
to a narrow view on peace summits,  
allows grasping ups and downs in 
peacemaking among exile communities 
and how these reflect the development 
of the violent conflict in the country of 
origin in the longer term. 
While history writing and media reporting of 
peace processes show a strong emphasis on official 
diplomatic summits, organically emerging initiatives 
for peace from among societies facing war and initi-
ated by individuals in exile have hardly received at-
tention by scholars, politicians and among the wider 
public. 
The analysis of engagement for peace 
by first-generation Afghans and Syrians 
in Germany with a special focus on 
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) 
demonstrates the vast spectrum of  
activities for peace and thus peace-
making agency among individuals and 
exile organisations. 
The activities range from personal initiatives to 
invite the representatives of the main warring par-
ties for dialogue forums, active lobbying of German 
political parties and members of parliament, regular 
public protests, publications and outreach to advocacy 
work addressing the German public and journalists. 
Nearly all such engagement has been privately funded 
and is based on voluntary work. 
Main findings
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Among Afghans and Syrians, there is  
severe fatigue for political engagement 
because of continuous war, a lack of 
support for political initiatives for peace, 
as well as growing frustration with  
official peace talks. 
The engagement of Afghans over more than four 
decades shows remarkable perseverance, as it does 
among Syrians who continue their voluntary engage-
ment despite the current military situation. However, 
there is an urgent need for structural and financial 
support which does not seek to introduce foreign 
models, but which respects enabling Afghans and 
Syrians in Germany to develop alternative visions for 
peace which are meaningful to their respective 
constituencies.
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This Working Paper emerged from our findings 
that until today, the official history writing and media 
reporting on “peace processes” almost exclusively 
captures high-level diplomatic events from the per-
spective of the United Nations and foreign ministries 
as they look onto wars and conflicts from the outside. 
Historical accounts and contemporary analyses, too, 
sideline the internal perspective of participants from 
among civil and armed groups  (Meininghaus, n.d.), 
as well as more unofficial processes of peacemaking, 
especially those to which no external parties are part. 
This shortcoming applies to most, if not all peace pro-
cesses that involve official diplomacy, and it is also 
true for Afghanistan and Syria. As peacemaking, we 
understand political engagement for peace. We thus 
understand peacemaking and peace processes as go-
ing far beyond “peak events” such as official talks.
This imbalance in reporting has led to a neglect 
of attention to peacemaking initiatives led by and for 
Afghans and Syrians not only inside Afghanistan and 
Syria but also when living abroad.1  With this in mind, 
we sought to document this non-official side to the 
history of peacemaking based on interviews with  
Afghans and Syrians who have been part of these pro-
cesses—official and inofficial—as well as those who 
wished to be part of these but were excluded or decided 
to keep their distance. As a guiding question for this 
Paper, we ask: To what extent have Afghans and Syrians 
in NRW and other parts of Germany been able to  
engage in peacemaking, and how are these efforts 
linked to official talks and the situation inside  
Afghanistan and Syria?
Our comparison of the peacemaking engagement 
among Afghans and Syrians is based on the observa-
tion that both communities have a strong presence 
in NRW and Germany in general. Although the  
Afghan and Syrian wars show significant differences, 
many Afghans and Syrians share similar experiences 
of war, losing their homes and loved ones, having to 
leave their home country, beginning a new life in 
Germany and their struggle between frustration and 
hope. As we show in the following, their histories and 
 
1 \  For ease of reading, we speak of Afghans and Syrians throughout the 
Paper. Some individuals may also strongly identify as German. All par-
ticipants in our research were born in Afghanistan and Syria, respec-
tively.
Introduction
peacemaking initiatives share many commonalities, 
such as the impact of the Cold War and the domi-
nance of international foreign policy in both inner- 
Afghan and inner-Syrian politics, but also in their 
engagement in Germany. In our analysis of their  
political engagement for peace, we will focus in each 
case on the first generations of immigrants who left 
after the outbreak of war, that is the decade after 1978 
for Afghanistan and post-2011 for Syria. We chose this 
focus because we found that political engagement  
is particularly strong in both cases shortly after the  
escalation of conflict, which has later been followed 
by a phase of fatigue.2  
Peace processes often fail. Strikingly, in the period 
between 1946 and 2010, only in less than half of all 
wars and conflicts, official peace processes were initi-
ated—the other are military victories or unresolved—
and in only about a quarter of cases, peace processes 
ended with a peace agreement (Kreutz, 2010, p. 246). 
Where they did, still half of these agreements col-
lapsed within the first five years (Convergne, 2016,  
pp. 144-45). These figures point to severe flaws in  
existing processes.
In peace processes in the formal sense, it is gen-
eral diplomatic practice to distinguish three different 
tracks of negotiations. Track 1 represents the highest 
diplomatic level, where usually heads of states and 
foreign ministers seek to negotiate political settle-
ments to wars including for example planned elec-
tions or constitutional reform. In parallel, track 2  
negotiations typically include civil society represent-
atives and those underrepresented in track 1, that is 
women, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or 
religious representatives. Last, track 3 negotiations 
are those which happen at the local or community 
level (Lederach, 1997; Paffenholz, 2014). Most negotia-
tions are not direct negotiations but mediated by a 
third party, such as the United Nations. Individuals 
living abroad are usually expected to be consulted  
 
2 \  This Paper forms part of a larger research project on war, peace and 
displacement titled “Between civil war and integration—Refugees and 
the challenges and opportunities of societal change in North Rhine- 
Westphalia”. Our analysis emerges out of its fourth module on “Peace 
negotiations, refugee rights and resources in the Syrian and Afghan 
peace processes”. The project has been funded by the Ministry of Cul-
ture and Research of the State of NRW. The project is independent.  
Empirical data solely remains with the authors.
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We make our argument in four steps: To begin 
with, we locate our research in the scholarly debate 
on diaspora/s and outline our methodological ap-
proach. We explain why we reject using the term  
“diaspora” and prefer to refer to individuals and 
groups instead (Chapter 2). In a second step, we  
describe how the wars in Afghanistan and Syria 
evolved historically, and how this is reflected in the 
presence of Afghans and Syrians in NRW and Germany 
(Chapter 3). Next, we document and analyse their 
peacemaking activities, the extent to which they 
were able to participate in Track 1 official talks (i.e. on 
the highest diplomatic level) and partially in Track 2 
civil society meetings, how the dynamics of their mo-
bilisation interrelate with the situation inside Afghan-
istan and Syria. The focus is on the first generation of 
Afghan and Syrian immigrants since the outbreak of 
armed conflict and war because these are the most 
politically engaged (i.e. post-1978 and post-2011, re-
spectively) (Chapter 4).3  We offer a comparative syn-
thesis and summarise our findings in the Conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 \  The second, third and fourth generations and the dynamics among 
them, are subject to further analysis and publication (planned).
and sometimes included in Tracks 2 and 3 (Paffenholz, 
2014). Yet, as this Paper will show, these attempts at 
“inclusivity” are neither transparent nor systematic 
and often ignore peacemaking initiatives undertaken 
outside the realms of formal talks instead of integrat-
ing them.
Our core argument is that so far, peacemaking 
research and practice have underestimated the  
grievances and dissatisfaction with the set-up and 
conduct of official talks among wider populations 
from countries at war, non-official peace initiatives 
and also peace process participants. This aspect, we 
propose, is crucial for understanding and addressing 
the low incidence of peace agreements and their fre-
quent collapse. We argue that shifting the focus to a 
perspective from within sheds light on the peace-
making initiatives ‘from below’, including among 
those living abroad. We consider them as crucial  
because they include individuals and groups excluded 
from official talks, and because participants in unoffi-
cial processes at times possess  strong linkages with 
constituencies inside the country. 
For several decades now, Germany has become a 
home for significant numbers of Afghans, and more 
recently Syrians, who have fled war. In NRW, Königs-
winter near Bonn hosted the UN Talks on Afghanistan 
in 2001. There, only few individuals who had fled  
Afghanistan and settled in Germany in earlier years 
played a prominent role, while most were excluded. 
Although the state of NRW and Germany as a whole 
are now home to the highest number of Syrian refu-
gees in Europe, very few Syrians based in Germany 
took part in the Syria negotiations in Geneva. There-
fore, this Paper analyses which kind of peacemaking 
engagement exists within these communities and 
how it is related to official talks. While it remains of 
primary importance that Afghans and Syrians who 
are staying inside Afghanistan and Syria see them-
selves represented in peacemaking, this Paper is dedi-
cated to the involvement of Afghans and Syrians in 
Germany and NRW to illustrate the significance of 
initiatives abroad.  
PEACEMAKING EFFORTS OF AFGHANS AND SYRIANS IN NRW AND GERMANY  \ E. MEININGHAUS & K. MIELKE  
9 \ \ WORKING PAPER 11  \ 2019
cosmopolitanism. As a consequence, most of the 
above mentioned key notions of diaspora have been 
abandoned which seems to imply that everything fits 
into diaspora studies (Cohen & Fischer, 2018). There 
are several valid arguments for abandoning the label  
diaspora studies altogether, starting from the obser-
vation of differences among people with the same 
country of origin-background. There is ample ‘inter-
nal’ politicisation and contestation of power dynam-
ics as to who speaks for whom and represents whom 
where; so-called diaspora communities are differen-
tiated by the time of emigration, place of residence, 
socio-economic status, skills, generation and class 
among others. In their commitment to the alleged 
homeland, members of ‘diaspora’ groups highly differ, 
some having been engaged at one point intensively, 
then having withdrawn for some reason or shifted 
the nature of engagement and the addressees (com-
patriots in the country of settlement vs./ and war/ 
peace/ development in the country of origin). Thus, 
so-called diasporic groups are characterised by a  
certain element of fluidity. Even the relationships 
among heterogeneous groups that share one country 
of origin cannot be grasped by a static pattern but are 
highly dynamic and change between cooperation, 
conflict, tolerance, co-existence, occasional subject- 
based interaction and joint action. It is obvious that 
this evidence contradicts the idea of an overarching 
diaspora from one country of origin-context (Fischer, 
2018, p. 16). However, as Horst (2013, p. 231) pointed out, 
“diaspora is such a powerful concept exactly because 
it ignores internal group differences and functions as 
rallying call” (see also Dufoix, 2008).         
From our perspective, the remaining idea that 
unites different scholars under the umbrella of dias-
pora studies still today seems to be the issue of 
group-constituting common or collective identities. 
If the plurality and fluidity of such identities are  
acknowledged, the discussion needs to be broadened 
to take account of de facto multiple diasporas of one 
country of origin (because several groups with com-
mon identities exist that work for their particular 
aims independently)—at different points of time or  
at least against the background of temporal change 
The dominant academic approach of how popula-
tions in exile or abroad have been conceptualised is 
as diaspora/s. Scholarship on diaspora/s has been 
highly dynamic over the last two decades and has 
moved a long way from the initial static perspective 
of diaspora as homogeneous groups that share a com-
mon conflict-related identity through initial dis-
placement, hailing from a real or imagined (Pales-
tine) homeland where diaspora members would long 
to return to (Cohen & Fischer, 2018). The essentialist 
flavour in this traditional conceptualisation of dias-
pora roots in the assumption of homogeneousness, a 
focus on the static groups themselves that seem to 
constitute dispersed aggregations of victims (Gamlen, 
2018, p. 302). Moreover, this reading suggests that  
diaspora members belong to one ‘genuine’ culture to 
which they return to at some point. This claim was 
substantiated on the one hand by the emphasis on 
collective myths and memories that would be kept 
alive about the homeland. On the other, scholarship 
pointed at a diaspora’s troubled relationship with the 
country of settlement, the concern for the country of 
origin’s well-being (safety, prosperity) and a high  
extent of intra-group solidarity. From a development 
and aid perspective, the latter assumption has come 
to underlie the imperative of funding diaspora organ-
isations by state and non-state development agencies 
and is also at the core of efforts to establish umbrella 
organisations that comprise all organised diaspora 
actors to tap their development potential for objec-
tives such as reconstruction and development of dif-
ferent—as a rule non-political—sectors, for instance 
in the field of health, education and infrastructure 
reconstruction in post-conflict countries (cf. Ge-
sellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2019; 
Kent, 2006). 
This said, the academic discussion on diaspora/s 
has become more differentiated, not least because 
empirical realities have pointed to other phenomena 
and given that a postmodern turn has entered dis-
cussions in this scholarly field as well. As a result,  
diaspora studies are increasingly characterised by 
the trend to acknowledge plurality, phenomena of 
hybridisation, creolisation and take account of 
From diaspora studies to research on exiles involved 
in peacemaking: Conceptual approach and methods 
of field research
PEACEMAKING EFFORTS OF AFGHANS AND SYRIANS IN NRW AND GERMANY  \ E. MEININGHAUS & K. MIELKE
10 \ \ WORKING PAPER 11  \ 2019
(cf. Alonso & Mylonas, 2019, p. 483). Three more con-
siderations challenge the surplus value of calling 
these groups diaspora. Heterogeneity and plurality 
become obvious if,
1\ the different positionalities (including personal 
commitments, political viewpoints, interests) of 
‘diaspora’ members are taken seriously.
2\ new insights of mobilisation scholarship are ac-
knowledged that highlight how ‘diaspora’ is not a 
prerequisite for mobilisation and diasporic action 
but on the contrary, that ‘diaspora’ groups are 
only constituted through mobilisation and are 
thus situative, ad hoc, particular interest-driven, 
temporal and figurative.4  
3\ the emphasis on collective or common identities 
implies that ‘diaspora’ or even diaspora groups 
can be treated as collective actors with some 
overarching agency. 
The homogenous viewpoint silences the individ-
ual and individual agency. Moreover, it does not do 
justice to the empirical observation that not all mi-
grants or refugees are part of or will become part of a 
putative diaspora because respective mobilisation at-
tempts do not resonate, or because mobilisation for a 
common cause as diaspora does not occur due to in-
dividuals’ particular positionalities, interests, etc.
Against this background, we do not speak of the 
Syrians or Afghans in Germany as diaspora or dias-
poric groups in this Paper. In our view, the only valid 
reason to stick to the label of diaspora would be if the 
members of the migrant and refugee groups covered 
here (the different generations with diverse move-
ment trajectories and underlying motives) used the 
term themselves or if it was popular among them. 
However, this is not the case. Thus, in the subsequent 
parts of the Working Paper we try to name the groups 
and individuals (albeit with pseudonyms where nec-
essary, see Methodology) by their own denominations 
to adhere to the differences they draw themselves 
(boundary making).5  Nevertheless, we regard some of 
4 \  Figurative in the sense of figurations as conceptualised by Norbert 
Elias (1978), that is normalcy of belonging to multiple figurations at 
the same time, bound together in each case by respective power  
differentials.
5 \  For a discussion of Afghans positioning beyond ‘diaspora’, see Fischer 
& Dahinden (2018, pp. 295-297).
the conceptual innovations in conventional diaspora 
studies as analytically productive and employ these  
for the purpose of our research but insist on avoiding 
the label diaspora.6  Among the new discussion strands 
in diaspora studies, the following are relevant for our 
research question on the peace/ conflict agency of 
exile groups and individuals: 
   \ The view of ‘diasporas’ and refugees as part of 
the solution vs. only a problem (Ostergaard- 
Nielsen, 2006; Milner, 2011), or peace-makers vs. 
peace-wreckers, in other words. A related aspect 
is considering mobilisation as a prerequisite to 
forming interest coalitions that act/ engage for 
‘peace’ or ‘war’ (Koinova, 2017). This includes 
fuelling conflict in the country of origin or 
among ‘diasporic’ groups in the country of  
settlement or working towards reconciliation, 
peacebuilding, sustainable cordial relations 
and the end of violent conflict (e.g. mobilisa-
tion for ethnic vs civic purposes) (Horst, 2013).
   \ The role of transnational and translocal ties 
and connectivity, i.e. between countries of ori-
gin and countries of settlement, thus taking  
account of multiple movements and temporal 
settlements.  
   \ The relevance of context/s for analysing ‘dias-
pora’ issues (Koinova, 2018, p. 1264), that is the 
factoring in of spatial, temporal, and relational 
factors.    
   \ The discussion of conflict transportation among 
different groups from the country of origin to 
the country of settlement and the other way 
around (Röing, 2019).
   \ The relationship between ‘diaspora’ engage-
ment not only with conflict processes here or 
there but also related to specific state disposi-
tions or challenges origin states and govern-
ments might face (Koinova 2018: 1254). This  
includes the aspect that exile groups and indi-
viduals may be somewhat discouraged to en- 
 
 
6 \  Another, not yet mentioned but weighty reason to reject the diaspora 
label stems also from the recent trend of linking diaspora to the secu-
ritisation debate (Feron & Lefort, 2019, p. 35), partly with extensions 
into prevention of violent extremism and (de)radicalisation debates. 
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gage with the country of origin because of the 
conditions there (bad governance, continuing 
conflict/ violence, level of corruption, etc.). 
\ The focus on time junctures and contentious 
events of ‘diaspora’ creation in so-called con-
tentious spaces (Feron & Lefort, 2019). There, 
such groups and subsequent activities evolve 
through mobilisation processes or, conversely, 
contention among exile groups forms the  
nucleus for conflict that not only involves exile 
groups and individuals. 
   \ The focus on the multiple ways that ‘diasporas’ 
and conflict co-construct each other (Cohen & 
Fischer, 2018, p. 4) in light of diverse temporal 
and spatial dimensions that condition group 
formation and perpetuation processes. This in-
cludes cases where conflicts become resources 
for ‘diaspora’ groups, in contrast to the view  
of ‘diasporas’ being mere constituents and re-
sources for conflict (Feron & Lefort, 2019, p. 46). 
These strands in diaspora studies demonstrate 
the broad range of the current conceptualisation of 
exile populations (somewhere and not necessarily 
settled, but on the move in longer temporal perspec-
tive). The prominence of mobilisation approaches in 
recent scholarship has saved traditional diaspora 
scholarship from the risk of essentialising groups 
and identities and being informed by assumptions of 
primordialism (Sökefeld, 2006). Brubaker (2015, p. 12), 
for example, suggests to “think of diaspora not in 
substantialist terms as bounded entity, but as an idi-
om, a stance, a claim”. Feron speaks of diaspora com-
munities as “sites in which processes of conflict or 
peace take place; i.e. vectors of conflict and conflict 
resolution at the same time” (2018, p. 15). Nevertheless, 
the respective stage of conflict might provide for dif-
ferences in context and thus different repertoires for 
‘diaspora’ agency. Bercovitch (2007) pointed out how 
different conflict phases relate to a more or less of 
‘diasporic’ engagement for peace. The underlying  
hypothesis is that each phase of a conflict generates 
different diasporic behaviour. Accordingly, the way a 
conflict is ended—the form/ profile of a peace 
agreement or the absence of such, or a stalemate, etc.—
encourages or discourages exiles’ commitment and 
engagement in the post-conflict order (cf. Baser & 
Toivanen, 2018, p. 350). Thus, opportunity structures, 
foreign policies and other political, economic and  
social factors determine the scope for relations and 
transactions for peace (Baser & Toivanen, 2018, p. 350). 
The emphasis on ‘diaspora’ as space of conflicts is 
productive and in this Paper includes individuals and 
exile groups that form to work for conflict resolution 
and peacemaking. This may occur either among each 
other or each with their respective relations or 
non-engagement with like-minded individuals and 
groups in other settlement contexts or the country of 
origin. This space manifests in the active ties and  
relations that result from practical engagement or ex-
change of some type. In our approach, we capture this 
phenomenon through the concept of agency, that is 
the ability to act in dependence of own dispositions 
and resources. This includes the dispositions and  
resources of individuals or groups in exile on the one 
hand and dispositions in the settlement context on 
the other (whereby both are closely interwoven and 
mutually dependent). The focus of this Paper is solely 
on the former. 
On the question of participation in peace processes, 
scholarship on “diaspora”, “migrant” and “refugee” 
populations has debated in what ways individuals liv-
ing abroad can harm (spoil) or strengthen peace pro-
cesses (cf. Vertovec, 2005). While advocacy and lobbying 
can be highly influential activities, an impact of exiles’ 
direct participation in peace talks is relatively unknown 
(Baser & Toivanen 2018, p. 349). In some cases, scholars 
have argued that diaspora would feed renewed cycles 
of violence from the outside, for example through  
remittances (Kaldor, 2012; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). Con-
versely, Zunzer emphasised for the case of Somalia that 
diaspora functioned “as a bridge to the international 
actors supporting the peace process” by providing 
advice and funding (Zunzer, 2004). Proposing differen-
tiation, Koinova compared the case of Albanian and  
Lebanese communities abroad to argue that within 
one alleged “diaspora”, individuals might support 
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radical, but also moderate positions (Koinova, 2011). 
Comparing the cases of Kurdish and Tamil diaspora 
in their respective peace processes, Baser and Swain 
(2008) stressed that it is necessary to consider closely 
to what extent individuals have actual constituencies 
inside their home countries to understand their lev-
erage. However, most scholarship on this point often 
actually focusses on the indirect influence of individ-
uals living abroad (e.g. financially). It hardly considers 
their relationships with participants in official talks, 
direct influence or the participation of “diaspora” 
therein. In contrast to much of the scholarship on 
organised diaspora and its focus on organisationally 
institutionalised representations7 , we aim to refine 
and extend earlier insights for peacemaking. Our 
own heuristic interest sets in one step earlier than 
when an armed conflict ends, namely in the peace-
making process and relates the conflict process and 
the way domestic and international forces/ actors 
handle the conflict to the exiles’ potential agency to 
engage in peace(making). Moreover, it focuses on the 
direct involvement—or attempts of involvement—of 
individuals or groups of exiles in peace processes. 
This approach allows us to not only take non-organ-
ised and organised groups of exiles into account but 
also consider individuals’ agency and commitments 
for peace. We, therefore, focus on actors, agency and 
concrete measures of explicitly political engagement 
that aims at conflict transformation in the countries 
of origin, that is Syria and Afghanistan.8  
7 \  Among them the EU-funded collaborative research project with 
BICC-participation (DIASPEACE) that primarily looked at the enabling 
or constraining factors influencing organised ‘diaspora’ engagement, 
the types of organisations, their means of operations and how these 
influenced dynamics of conflict and peace in their countries of origin 
in the case of the transnational political activities of Somali, Ethiopian 
and Eritrean diaspora organisations based in Europe (Warnecke, 2010; 
Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2008-11).
8 \  It goes without saying that peacemaking understood as political  
activities is (just) one sphere of engagement Syrians and Afghans are 
involved in. Van Hear & Cohen (2016) as well as Fischer (2018), for  
example, distinguishe three spheres of transnational engagement, 
that is between the private, the known community and the ‘imagined’ 
community, or largely public sphere. These spheres are never mutually 
exclusive but likely amplify each other.
Methods of field research
To operationalise this methodological approach, 
our research is based on an oral history approach. It 
relies on multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork (includ-
ing phone interviews) in different regions for this  
Paper in Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, France, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, and  
Turkey. We have carried out unstructured open-ended 
life history interviews and semi-structured thematic 
interviews with research participants who currently 
are part of official or unofficial peace processes, who 
used to be part of these but were excluded/left out, or 
who wanted to participate but remained excluded. 
For the Syrian case, we have regularly repeated inter-
views to capture changes in the processes while 
these are ongoing from the point of view of our re-
search participants. We use our own networks of con-
tacts from the past twelve to fifteen years of working 
with Syrians/Afghans, snowball sampling and media 
and archival analysis to approach participants. Media 
analysis, the grey literature (e.g. NGO reports), archival 
work and existing scholarship also form the basis of 
actor mappings (armed and civilian opposition groups) 
and for triangulating data to the greatest extent pos-
sible. Overall, 22 interviews (four with females) have 
become a part of this Paper.9  In addition, we invited 
Afghan and Syrian individuals and representatives of 
associations for a workshop, which we held at BICC 
in Bonn in November 2019 to discuss their experiences 
in peace processes.
Taken together, these approaches allow a critical 
analysis of diverging narratives and in this manner 
serve to preserve the history of (attempts of) peace-
making understood from an internal perspective. 
With the analysis, we seek to understand how a  
careful consideration of networks, resources and a 
prioritisation of concerns discussed by the negotiat-
ing parties—rather than mediators—could help 
peacemaking gain traction and improve the chances 
for longer-term peace.
9 \  The project his Paper draws on relies on ethical guidelines specifically 
developed for this purpose and specified for this module. All data is 
anonymised.
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With the so-called April (Saur) Revolution in 1978, 
a coup d’état by Marxist groups which resulted in a 
turn-around of Afghan domestic and foreign policy, 
this particular strata of society was dubbed bourgeois 
and persecuted subsequently. As a reaction to the vio-
lent advent to power of the Marxist government, a 
heterogeneous, countrywide resistance formed that 
was heavily opposed to the reform programme11  and 
disparaged it as communist and against Islam. A civil 
war began in which all critics and opponents were 
persecuted as enemies of the regime. Those who were 
able left the country at this point. The first large-scale 
refugee emigration set in more than one-and-a-half 
years later after the Soviet military intervention on 
26/27 December 197912  that resulted in massive violence, 
for example by carpet-bombing, and high numbers of 
casualties among the population. In the subsequent 
decade of Soviet intervention, up to six million people 
were displaced outside the borders of Afghanistan. 
While most refugees stayed in the neighbouring 
countries Iran and Pakistan, Afghans have since been 
dispersed throughout the world, with more than 
250,000 finding refuge in OECD countries as of 2010 
(Centlivres-Demont, 2010, p. 39). Figures about Afghans 
in West Germany13  and NRW mirror this development 
(Figure 1): While in 1978, only 1,600 Afghans resided 
in Germany, the number increased almost fourfold to 
6,000 in 1980 and 22,000 in 1989, the year of Soviet  
 
Afghanistan after World War II in the ensuing Cold War between the 
Superpowers United States and Soviet Union.
11 \  The reform agenda included the abolition of the bride price and usury, 
dis-appropriation and redistribution of 1.2 hectares of land for peas-
ants, literacy and education programmes for the rural population, etc. 
With this spectrum of activities, traditional and rural elites in particu-
lar saw the bases of their power erode and subsequently opposed the 
reforms violently, using the rhetoric of jihad as an instrument to 
touch upon the moral bases of the widely conservative rural popula-
tion and mobilise them against the new regime.
12 \  This is not the place to elaborate on the background of the Soviet Un-
ion’s military intervention in Afghanistan. For an overview of recent 
research on the motives, course of development and impact of the in-
tervention see Meier & Penter (2017) and Fenzel (2017).
13 \  The relations between Afghanistan and the German Democratic Re-
public (GDR) were not well developed before 1979; the GDR did not 
even have an embassy in Kabul until 1978 (Ruttig, 2010, p. 128). Academ-
ic exchange started only in 1979 between Kabul and Humboldt Univer-
sity Berlin where up to 50 students took up studies (diploma- and 
PhD-level, e.g. in medicine) annually in the decade before the reunifi-
cation of Germany in 1990 (cf. Binder, 1994, p. 20). Besides that, Afghan 
journalists and military personnel of different ranks were trained in 
the GDR.  
Although the history of Afghans and Syrians who 
have come to NRW and Germany more broadly is often 
intertwined with war and political persecution, their 
presence also reflects long-standing bilateral institu-
tional cooperations, for example between Afghan/ 
Syrian and German universities and ministries going 
back to the 1960s and 1970s. The following section 
describes the major phases of immigration and un-
derlying conflict dynamics among both Afghans and 
Syrians historically. It lays the ground for our analysis 
of how peacemaking efforts have evolved among  
Afghans and Syrians in Germany in the next chapter. 
Afghans: Repeated wars resulted  
in four generations of immigrants in  
Germany
Afghans have settled in NRW for a long time. The 
first more significant number of Afghans who arrived 
goes back to the establishment of university partner-
ships between the faculties of economics at the  
University of Kabul and the University of Cologne 
and the faculties of natural sciences of Kabul and the 
University of Bonn in March 1962 (Renesse, 2016, p. 6). 
A cooperation agreement between the faculties of 
economics at Bonn, Cologne and Bochum universities 
followed in August 1966 (Renesse, 2016, p. 7). This col-
laboration is especially noteworthy because it consti-
tuted the basis for mutual contacts and the qualifica-
tion of Afghan scientists and faculty who were able to 
teach and conduct research at West-German univer-
sities after the start of the violent conflict in Afghani-
stan, when many could not stay in or return to Kabul. 
These first generations of students, PhDs and faculty 
hailed from elite families in Kabul that were well  
reputed, of more or less traditional influence in Afghan 
society, and rather well off. Many had been educated 
at the German-language Amani High School in Kabul, 
which was a very prominent higher learning institu-
tion because of a traditional German-friendly attitude 
 of Afghans.10      
10 \  Rooted in close historical ties from the start of Afghan independence 
in 1919, the state visit of King Amanullah and his wife in Berlin in 
1928; the admiration for German products, quality production stand-
ards, but also war strategy, collaboration in the wars; Germany not 
being a colonial power with respective stakes in Afghanistan such as 
Great Britain (legacy of three Anglo-Afghan wars), and assistance for 
History of the settlement of Syrians and Afghans in 
NRW and Germany
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withdrawal. However, within another three years, the 
number almost doubled to 41,528,14  and in the decade 
after Soviet withdrawal, the number more than tripled, 
thus amounting to 71,955 Afghan citizens in Germany 
in 1999. However, the communist regime stayed in 
power. The second refugee generation (1993-95) com-
prised those who had supported the Najibullah/ com-
munist regimes since 1979, plus ordinary citizens 
who suffered from the ensuing civil war. A third refu-
gee generation arrived after the onset of the Taliban  
regime in 1995/96. They consisted of the left-behinds 
who had arranged their living previously but had 
now fled from Taliban persecution and violence from 
Taliban-opposition fighting or diminishing liveli-
hood options under an international embargo and 
humanitarian emergency, not least due to protracted 
drought conditions. The continuation of rule by vio-
lent means and resistance explains the steady rise in 
refugee numbers from Afghanistan. A preliminary 
peak with 71,662 registered Afghan citizens in Germany, 
thereof 12,272 Afghans in NRW, was reached in 2001, 
the year that the international military intervention 
caused the Taliban to retreat and give up state power.
After 2001, a return-friendly climate with some-
what peaceful conditions in Afghanistan was of short 
duration; actual peace had not been negotiated (see 
Box 1: UN Talks on Afghanistan). From 2006 onwards, 
a growing insurgency challenged the rule of the 
elected, internationally-backed government and its 
own and foreign military and once again caused larger 
numbers of people to be displaced. The emigration is 
tangible in numbers (see Figure 1); while until 2009, 
the numbers of Afghans in Germany had been de-
creasing, a reverse trend becomes visible in 2010 
and has been continuing since (fourth generation), 
amplified clearly by the arrival of a disproportionate 
number of Afghans in the period 2014 to 2016 following 
rumours of open borders and economic prospects 
and prosperity in Germany. 
14 \  Cf. Orywal (1993, pp. 17-18), who indicated that the displacement situa-
tion in Afghanistan worsened and led to a 100 per cent increase of im-
migrants in Germany in the first three years after the withdrawal of 
the Soviet armed forces in 1989.
After considerable return rates in the early 2000s, 
those arriving in Germany following the spike of vio-
lence in Afghanistan in 2009 were of mixed back-
ground. Some had hoped to build their future in  
Afghanistan after 2001 but had been unable to realise 
their hopes. The large influx of Afghans from 2014  
onwards reflected the desperation, disappointment, 
lack of perspective but also adventurism to some  
extent, of largely Afghan youth who took the chance 
to migrate to Germany in search of a better life. To try 
to determine mono-causal reasons for their decisions 
to leave Afghanistan or exile in Iran/ Pakistan would 
be futile because it is impossible to disentangle socio- 
economic reasons from factors driving the protracted 
violent conflict and ongoing displacement crisis in 
the region. Many of the newly arriving Afghans have 
only little education or are even illiterate (as is the 
case with female refugees who were largely deprived 
of education in the Taliban years 1995/96–2001) and 
some of whom are of precarious socio-economic and 
low-status backgrounds. These and others have en-
dured the impact of 30 to 35 years of war in the coun-
try or were displaced inside Afghanistan or the neigh-
bouring countries. There is a stark contrast between 
this later group with the earlier generations that has 
prompted some of the socially engaged members of 
the first generations to commit time and resources to 
working with newly arriving Afghans, for instance 
offering general guidance, literacy courses and other 
(integration) support (Daxner & Nicola, 2017, pp. 42-44). 
Currently, more than 41,000 Afghan citizens live 
in NRW, more than the total sum of Afghan refugees 
in Germany in 1992 (then as result of displacement 
following a decade-long Soviet intervention and 
three years continuing anti-government war). In 
comparison to 2010, when the lowest number of reg-
istered Afghan citizens in NRW was recorded (7,823 
persons), the population share of Afghans has in-
creased more than five-fold. Nevertheless, overall, it  
is small when the share among registered foreign  
citizens in NRW is considered; Afghans constituted 
0.44 per cent of all foreigners in NRW in 2010 and 1.6 
per cent in 2018.
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Figure 1
Numbers of Syrians and Afghans in Germany and NRW
* The figures for Afghan and Syrian citizens living in former West Germany and united Germany from 1990 onwards were compiled from the 
D-Statis website, the ones for Afghan and Syrian citizens in NRW as well as the number of foreign citizens in NRW were generated online from 
Landesdatenbank NRW.
** Baraulina, Bommes, El-Cherkeh, Daume & Vadean (2007, pp. 10-13) point out that the decrease is related to continued higher levels of natural-
isation in the early 2000s and low numbers of new immigrants from Afghanistan.
*** Naturalised Afghans, that is German citizens of Afghan origin, have also returned to Afghanistan in larger numbers after 2001. While some 
voluntarily gave up German citizenship because they served in government ranks and were legally required to abandon any double citizenship—as 
in the case of Amin Farhang who was appointed Minister for Reconstruction in the 2001-interim cabinet of Afghanistan under interim-president 
Hamid Karzai—, others felt the obligation to contribute to reconstruction in their professional or private capacity (in particular members of the 
first generation of Afghan refugees in Germany).
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vocational training (Trentin, 2009, pp. 498–99). It also 
entailed intelligence collaboration, by which the Stasi 
(Staatssicherheitsdienst, state intelligence) trained Syrian 
intelligence forces. By 1985, for example, more than 
800 Syrians studied in East Germany, and Syrians 
were also trained in GDR military academies (Bundes- 
beauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheits-
dienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik, 1985, 1987). In contrast, primarily those who 
came from well-off urban families studied in the 
West. A degree in the United States, the United King-
dom or West Germany was highly regarded especially 
in technical subjects (such as engineering), although 
ideologically, studying in the West was at odds with 
the regime. Only privileged families could afford such 
degrees for the children and receive permission for 
them to leave—and to be permitted to return (Trentin, 
2009, pp. 498-99). 
A second phase of immigration began in the early 
1980s which, at the same time, also saw the emigra-
tion of Syrians from Germany. Those especially with 
medical degrees received higher salaries in Syria—
and engineers in the Gulf—than in Germany consid-
ering the living expenses. At the same time, a persis-
tent economic crisis inside Syria and the regime’s 
brutal crackdown on political dissidents led others to 
leave (interview 25 November 2019). 
Indeed, political dissidents sought refuge in  
Germany from early on, and these mirrored that  
although organised political opposition inside Syria 
was forbidden and hence very dangerous, a spectrum 
of political resistance did exist. Dissidents could not 
flee to East Germany since the equally socialist GDR 
was a close ally of the Syrian regimes, so West Germany 
also became home to those who left Syria or who 
were expelled for political reasons. These included 
persons identifying with the Syrian Muslim Brother-
hood, who at the time advocated for religion to play  
a greater role in Syrian politics, for civil rights, and 
economic liberalisation (Batatu, 1982). The conflict 
between the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and the 
Ba’thist regimes escalated into violent repression and 
attacks over the 1960s and 1970s (Abd-Allah, 1983;  
Batatu, 1982). During these years, members of the 
Syrians: Developments inside Syria and 
Syrians arriving in Germany   
Although Syrians also have a long history in Ger-
many, it is hardly documented. For most, however, it 
is more recent. As in the case of Afghan experiences, 
however, their history has been closely tied to inter-
nal politics inside Syria. A period of frequent military 
coups in the 1950s and 1960s first resulted in different 
military regimes ideologically following the Socialist 
Ba’th Party in 1963. This included the 30-year regime 
under Hafiz al-Asad, who through a military coup  
became president in 1970, followed after his death by 
the presidency of his son Bashar al-Asad until today. 
Historically, it was mainly internal repression under 
these subsequent dictatorships and economic mo-
tives that have led to continuous emigration and  
immigration into Germany.  
Among Syrians, we can mainly discern three dif-
ferent periods of immigration: Pre-war immigration 
(1960s until early 1980s; 1980s until 2011), and immi-
gration since then. While among Afghans who came 
to Germany at different periods of time, we can discern 
differences in their educational and socio- economic 
background for each identified generation, the situa-
tion among Syrians has been more heterogeneous. 
From the beginning of figures recorded in the 1960s, 
Syrians who came to Germany did so against the 
backdrop of the dictatorship at home and the  
regimes’ foreign relations to the two Germanies, 
respectively. 
Throughout the time until 1991, that is the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union and German reunification, 
Syrians from very different backgrounds arrived  
in Germany. Many did so to continue their higher  
education in German universities (Council for 
At-Risk-Academics, 2019, p. 38). Among them were  
students from poorer and better off backgrounds who 
maintained close relationships with the regime—
partially by conviction, partially out of necessity—
and who would study in Russia or East Germany, often 
on scholarships. Exchanges included military and 
technical training, such as support for centralised 
state-building, but also university cooperation and 
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and Iraq. Today, of a pre-war population of 21 million, 
5.6 million Syrians are refugees, and another 6.2 mil-
lion Syrians had to leave their homes and flee inside 
Syria to save their lives, many of whom now live in 
precarious conditions. By December 2018, 770,000  
Syrians had requested asylum in Germany since the 
beginning of the war (Mediendienst Integration, 
2019). Within Europe, Germany is hence home to 
most Syrians (Ragab & Katbeh, 2017, p. 13). Since 2011, 
those who had arrived in Germany were mainly refu-
gees asking for asylum—although not exclusively 
because professional immigration continued. The 
label “refugee”, however, disguises that newly arriving 
Syrians came from a wide range of backgrounds,  
including poor families and individuals from remote 
rural as well as urban areas, farmers, traders, workers, 
as well as teachers, lawyers, doctors and academics. 
Politically, those who fled primarily did so out of fear 
of the regime. Socio-economically, this third genera-
tion of Syrian immigrants is the most diverse. Simi-
larly to the Afghan experience, Syrians who had set-
tled in Germany before 2011 rallied forces to provide 
support to those arriving anew. Among the German 
federal states, most Syrians now live in NRW (206,240 
by late 2018).16 
16 \  Refugees arriving in Germany cannot freely choose their place of  
residence, but they are assigned to one of the sixteen federal states 
according to the “Königsstein key” (cf. Christ, Meininghaus & Röing, 2019).
Muslim Brotherhood began to come to West Germany 
following persecution and/or expulsion from Syria 
(interviews 23 April 2018, 25 November 2019). In 1982, 
the regime sealed off the town of Hamah entirely for 
27 days, where it alleged that members of Muslim 
Brotherhood were plotting attacks and indiscrimi-
nately killed an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 persons. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was then outlawed in Syria. 
Thereafter, the regime carried out large-scale arrests 
and purges targeting alleged members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and secular dissidents alike (interviews 
23 April 2018, 27 June 2018, 25 February 2019).
Equally, individuals who identified with different 
groups among the secular Leftist opposition came to 
West Germany during those decades. Paradoxically, 
this was also true for regime loyalists who came pri-
marily to Bonn as the West German capital at the 
time to work in the Syrian embassy, as well as traders 
and professionals (especially medical doctors) from 
across the whole political and socio-economic spec-
trum. It can be noted that most Syrians who arrived 
in Germany before 1991,15  with the exception of those 
who came on regime scholarships to East Germany, 
would have come largely from an urban and highly 
educated background. Syrians in East Germany were 
joined by a second generation of immigrants for whom 
living in East Germany was much more affordable 
than staying inside Syria, especially during the 1980s 
and 1990s. By 2010, that is just before the beginning of 
mass protests, 30,133 Syrians already lived in Germany— 
9,877 of these in NRW (cf. Figure 1). 
For Syrians inside the country of origin as well as 
those who already lived in Germany, the situation 
changed drastically when, after more than four  
decades of brutal dictatorship, Syrians organised and 
joined protests against the regime in growing num-
bers from February 2011 onwards, demanding demo-
cratic reform, civil rights (freedom of speech, right to 
assembly), the release of political prisoners, and even-
tually the president to step down. In the ensuing  
escalation into war, Syrians began to flee within Syria 
and across the borders to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan  
 
15 \  Before German reunification in 1990, statistics only listed Syrians in 
West Germany. From 1990 onwards, statistics included both. This is 
mirrored by the ‘increase’ by nearly 50 per cent of Syrians in Germany 
in Figure 1 (from 10,694, 1989, to 14,504, 1990)
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Grassroots mobilisation among Afghans: Political 
upheavals inside Afghanistan and opposition to the 
Soviet intervention
Global political influences and international ex-
changes (Afghans studying abroad; foreigners living, 
working and travelling in Afghanistan) contributed 
to the evolution of different leftist and Islamic funda-
mentalist political movements, groups and parties, 
from Maoist to Marxist, nationalist-democratic, and 
Islamists (Pohly, 1992, pp. 116-234). One such hotspot 
where international influences resonated and were 
subsequently discussed, selectively adopted or rejected 
was Kabul University, the place where many Afghans 
with an educational background from West German 
universities taught in the 1970s or had started their 
education in the 1960s. From the late 1960s onwards, 
Kabul University has been at the centre of political 
activities and anti-government protests. 
Interviewees who had graduated with diplomas 
or PhDs in Germany and taught at the economic  
faculty of Kabul University in the 1970s described the  
political climate as difficult. Highly politicised student 
groups demanded progressive teaching content in 
subjects like accounting and finance or banking.  
Faculty members from Eastern bloc countries felt  
inferior to Western colleagues regarding the state of 
their knowledge and their connectivity to interna-
tional scholarship and research in their respective 
scientific field (interview 1/2, 30 October 2019). With 
the Marxist factions’ coup d’état in 1978 and the sub-
sequent coup d’état by one of the two constituting 
factions of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghani-
stan (PDPA), some of the German-educated faculty 
members chose what they called ‘passive resistance’ 
to the ‘communist’18  takeover—and left Afghanistan 
18 \  The ideological orientation of the two factions (khalq and parcham) 
that formed the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was 
Marxist in nature. Interview interlocutors and a major proportion of 
the literature labels these factions, the regime and the coup d’état not 
entirely correct as ‘communist’. In this Paper, the label ‘communist’ is 
attributed to the regime from 27 December 1979 onwards, i.e. beginning 
with the Soviet military intervention and their installation of Babrak 
Karmal as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers directly from his previous exile in the Soviet 
Union. In this position, he introduced intra-party reforms until the end 
of his chairmanships in 1981. (He remained President of the country and 
Secretary General of the PDPA until 1986.) Given the prominent role 
The situation in their country of origin played a 
substantial role for many Afghans and Syrians in 
their decision to leave home and try to build a new 
life in Germany. Cold War politics influenced internal 
politics decisively in both countries, and until now, 
both countries remain of high interest to external  
actors often unwanted by Afghans and Syrians them-
selves. In the following section, we discuss how once 
in Germany, Afghans and Syrians have begun to en-
gage in individual initiatives and to establish formal 
associations in an attempt to influence the situation 
in Afghanistan and Syria, respectively. Our research 
focuses in particular on extent to which they were 
able to participate in Track 1 official talks (that is on 
the highest diplomatic level) and how the dynamics 
of their mobilisation interrelate with the situation 
inside Afghanistan and Syria.
Afghans: A plural field of contentious 
actors, interests and means of political 
engagement
Quite a lot has been written about conflict and 
tensions among the different generations of Afghans 
seeking refuge and settling in Germany (Mogaddedi, 
2010; Braakman, 2005, p. 30; Fischer, 2018). Roughly, 
the superficial impression suggests that the persecu-
tors of the first generation, that is members and 
followers of the Marxist regimes from 1978 onwards 
arrived in Germany—after having been persecuted 
themselves by the Islamist opposition—would have 
avoided too much contact with the first generation 
who had fled until 1992.17  What is generally over-
looked is that the first generation of Afghans in 
Germany and NRW was not at all homogeneous. 
Rather, it resembled the factionalism that had 
evolved in urban Afghanistan from the second half 
of the 1960s onwards.
17 \  Sholarship holders, interns and students who had studied in the Soviet 
Union and other Eastern bloc countries between 1978 and 1990/91 were 
also part of the second generation (cf. Centlivres-Demont, 2010, p. 42). 
Spectre of activities and political engagement
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Three of these seven parties considered the return to 
a monarchy or the integration of the ex-king Zaher 
Shah as symbolic figure of unity in a future govern-
ment permissible. For that reason, these parties car-
ried the label traditional/ moderate Islamists21  while 
four parties were hard-line Islamic fundamentalists 
who aimed at establishing an Islamic State (of Afghan-
istan) based on a fundamentalist interpretation of 
Islamic law (sharia).22  Without a permanent repre- 
sentation in Europe or elsewhere abroad, the national 
democratic forces inside Afghanistan were the main 
enemies of the Islamist hardliners, followed by other 
left-leaning parties. Wherever possible, the massively 
funded Islamists used their influence to fight the  
national democratic forces (inside Afghanistan) and 
leftists as first priority and enforce their interests 
against the traditionalists as second priority. 
Despite the fact that that in far exile, the fronts 
were not as defined as they were inside the country or 
across the border in Peshawar, Pakistan (the so-called 
near exile), the political space in West Germany and 
its capital Bonn in particular provided a platform for 
what in Afghanistan was considered a “war inside 
the war”. In Germany, the conflict played out in a 
competition or rivalry between the various factions 
of different political orientations.23  Under the guise  
of resistance against the communist regime and the 
Soviet intervention, the different political factions 
competed in their activities to lobby German political 
parties, foundations, exiled Afghans and refugees, 
other Muslim communities in Germany as well as 
the public to garner support for their particular goals. 
In this competition, the Islamist parties were the 
most successful given the dominance of Cold War 
ideological bias against communism. This political 
attitude was responsible for the Islamists’ dispropor-
tionate access to funding and political offices in  
Germany (Jahn, 2019). As these fundamentalist Islamic 
 
 
21 \  Mahaz-e Melli-ye Islami (Gailani), Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami (Nabi), 
Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli (Mojadeddi).
22 \  Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG), Hezb-e Islami of 
Yunus Khales (HIK), Ittehad-e Islami (Sayyaf), and Jamiat-e Islami 
(Rabbani).
23 \  On several levels: competition about the interpretation of the causes, 
process and factions in the conflict, access to German politicians, par-
ties, political foundations, protest spaces, funding, etc. 
more or less soon after the coup or did not return to 
Kabul from their exchange visits during the govern-
ment reshuffle—or actively resisted for a while. For 
example, an underground group of faculty who had 
been educated in West Germany published materials 
(shabnama, literally: night letters) denouncing the 
communist regime. They understood themselves as 
liberal and progressive monarchists, had been upset 
by the regime changes starting in 197319  and taken by 
surprise by the communist takeover that led to the 
Soviet intervention (interview 2/2, 30 October 2019). 
As exiles in Germany, they were part of an intellectual 
group of technocrats that engaged in various political 
activities to oppose the communist regime, take 
measures for the formation of an alternative govern-
ment and contribute to peacemaking in Afghanistan 
(see Chapter 4). 
Other politically active exiles from Afghanistan 
had joined the left-wing General Union of Afghan 
Students Abroad (GUAfS), established in 1968 but  
increasingly fragmented from 1979 onwards. On the 
opposite side of the spectrum were the representa-
tives, sympathisers, followers and new recruits of the 
various Islamist factions. Institutionalised by the 
generous support of Western and allied countries 
(that supplied money, arms and intelligence, etc.), 
seven parties had been officially recognised in 1984 to 
operate from Peshawar in Pakistan against the Soviet- 
backed Kabul government and the Soviet and Afghan 
army in a Cold War proxy war (Rubin, 1989, p. 74).20  
 Soviet advisors and personnel played by their presence in Afghanistan 
from 27 December 1979 onwards, the shifting label from Marxist to 
communist is deemed to address this suspected change in ideological 
underpinnings from a more indigenous Afghan Marxist leaning to the 
adjustment of predominantly Soviet ideological content.  
19 \  Mohammad Daud, previous Minister of the Interior (1949-50) and 
Prime Minister (1953-63; during this tenure he permitted women to 
abandon the veil) and initiator of two five-year plans (1956-61, 1962-67) 
staged a coup against King Zaher Shah (his cousin) in 1973 and pro-
claimed Afghanistan a republic. His firm line against the emerging 
Islamist movement created fierce opposition by these and other politi-
cally organised Afghans because he created an own party as umbrella 
to include all existing political movements (Adamec, 2006, p. 256).  
Previously, political parties were not allowed by law.
20 \  To what extent Shiite (usually Iranian-backed and not represented 
in Peshawar/ Pakistan) parties and associations were active in West 
Germany, Bonn and NRW remains subject to further research. The 
only publication of Shiite organisations in Germany that was listed in 
Grevemeyer & Maiwand-Grevemeyer (1988, p. 39) is the newspaper Saff, 
published by the Unity of Islamic Associations of Afghan Students in 
Heidelberg from 1978 onwards.
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When considering exile activities from the very 
beginning until the time of writing, a shift of empha-
sis from initial highly political engagement and  
activities to more development and reconstruction-  
oriented activities and engagement can be discerned. 
However, importantly, the “non-political” develop-
ment activists of the 2000s are not entirely the same 
as those who had previously engaged themselves  
politically for peace or conflict resolution. To claim 
this would mean to deny a large number of exiles 
who had previously been active both individually 
and collectively the amount of frustration and subse-
quent withdrawal from public engagement. The 
sense of frustration is substantial, especially among 
the “earnest” peacemakers of the 1980s and 1990s; 
this has caused them to withdraw from the political 
process entirely. Only very few of the interviewed 
from this group have taken on active roles in post-
2001 Afghanistan. If they did, many experienced  
frustration in their postings and have subsequently 
retired. Frustration rooted in the fact that they wee 
not able to apply learned political practices of the 
West German political system to the realities and 
processes in the post-2001 Afghan political landscape. 
To give some examples: Former exile Afghans faced 
suspicion and prejudices regarding their suitability 
for the jobs they had been appointed to do (for in-
stance university rectors, ministers, heads of political 
offices).25  One common offence they were accused of 
was their exile background, which meant that they 
had not been fighting inside the country or from  
immediate/ near exile in Pakistan or Iran. This also 
implied a certain distance and unfamiliarity with  
Afghanistan in the eyes of their critics.26  Moreover, 
tackling corruption inside the offices they had been 
in charge of deemed a major challenge that left some 
with the impression that they were fighting against 
windmills (interview, 16 July 2019).  
25 \  Various interviews, e.g. one phone interview, one in person on 30 Oc-
tober 2019.
26 \  This common prejudice the so-called mujahidin had made central to 
their political propaganda against other-minded (i.e. anti-Islamist) 
Afghan exiles residing in Western countries.
parties constituted the front against what was per-
ceived as Soviet imperialism in Central Asia, their 
non-democratic political agenda was ignored and 
tolerated at best in line with the motto “the enemy  
of my enemy is my friend”. 
In Bonn, the four Islamist parties had one repre-
sentative each; the three Islamic (moderate) tradi-
tionalist parties were represented by one person who 
was their European representative at the same time, 
that is in charge of representing the three parties in 
all European countries. Hezb-e Islami had its own  
office called “Information Bureau of the Afghan  
Mujahidin” with an adjacent mosque in Bonn (Theater- 
straße). The office name alludes to Hezb-e Islami’s 
claim for holistic representation of all Afghan muja-
hidin (liberation fighters) and represents the fact that 
it was able to dominate the Islamist “resistance” from 
the mid-1980s onwards due to massive funding.24  
Pro-monarchy groups and individuals partly had  
mutual antipathies; the same was true for techno-
crats’ attitude towards the role of the former king in a 
future government. The latter was definitely a point 
of contention. However, with time passing and the 
former king himself never showing much enthusiasm 
to take over state leadership again, the different polit-
ical factions grew sympathetic to the idea that his 
role as a symbolic figure of unity would be one of very 
few productive starting points for a post-war govern-
ment and peacemaking. Afghans perceived the last 
ten years of his rule as “Golden years”, a time of peace 
and a relative liberal political climate based on the 
Western-inspired 1963/64 constitution (constitutional 
monarchy).
24 \  Various sources: US and Gulf state financial support channelled via 
CIA/ Government of Pakistan and Islamic charities to Hezb-e Islami 
commanders, refugee camps and party-offices in Peshawar. Due to its 
extremist views and comparatively organised structure that set it 
apart from the other Islamist parties, HIG (the Hezb-e Islami faction 
of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) was chosen to be the main recipient of 
weapons and funds by the US-allied donors in the Cold War. Noteworthy, 
in Germany, the Turkish exile community collected and donated large 
sums of money to HIG, allegedly because Recep Tayyib Erdogan—then 
a prominent member of the Islamist Welfare Party in Turkey/ Istanbul 
chapter—enjoyed a close relationship with HIG-leader Gulbuddin  
Hekmatyar.
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to cross into Afghanistan from Pakistan behind the 
Soviet line and under permanent threat of being  
discovered.29  HIK enabled a German member of par-
liament from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
to travel to Peshawar and meet mujahidin command-
ers, Islamist party leaders, for instance Sayyaf, as well 
as Sibghatullah Mojaddedi after his election as interim 
President for Afghanistan, in April 1989 (Todenhöfer, 
1989, pp. 141-150). KUPFA e.V., with its engagement 
between humanitarian aid, independent protest  
actions and political information campaigning30,   
organised a ‘promotional’ tour for NEFA (National 
Unity Front of Afghanistan)31  in Germany to bring its 
aims and resistance activities inside Afghanistan to 
the awareness of the West German government, jour-
nalists, church representatives and the wider public 
(Komitee zur Unterstützung der politischen Flücht-
linge in Afghanistan, 1986, p. 16). On other occasions, 
GUAfS and Afghan centre-left activists invited people 
from Afghanistan who represented the opposition  
inside the country and often worked in the under-
ground in the 1980s, for instance Keshwar Kamal (“Es 
stimmt, daß..., 1982) of “Revolutionary League”, a 
women’s organisation for gender equality and social 
justice.
Lobbying activities of the Islamist parties’ repre-
sentatives towards lawmakers, political parties and 
society in West Germany resulted most significantly 
in two parliamentary resolutions that requested the 
government to provide humanitarian aid to Afghan 
 
29 \  Interestingly, Scholl-Latour was given company by his organisers; 
two Afghan students who studied engineering in Hildesheim and  
sociology in Straßburg (and in all likelihood interrupted their education 
to take part in the jihad) served as translators on this trip. See Scholl- 
Latour (1985 [1983], p. 611) pp. 608-629). The accounts of Scholl-Latour 
(1985 [1983], p. 611) pp. 608-629) are interesting from another point of 
view, as he mentions how journalist colleagues in Peshawar had asked 
him reproachfully why he had chosen the HIG as most extremist  
Islamic group to report about, thus suggesting that other journalists 
were aware and rather critical of the HIG agenda as fundamentalist 
party. On another note, the account describes how HIG pursued a very 
egoistic political agenda with organising the trip for Scholl-Latour, 
hoping he and his team would make it to one of their planned great 
battles and report to the world about it (1985 [1983], p. 611) pp. 608-629).
30 \  In their own activities report, they state that they collected evidence 
of new Soviet weapons that would be used to target primarily Afghan 
civilians; they presented this evidence to the press in 1982 (KUPFA, 
1986, p. 16). 
31 \  NEFA largely represented the resistance inside Afghanistan; its activ-
ists were opposed to the Islamist parties and did not go into exile.
Privately initiated political engagement for peace 
among Afghans in NRW and in Germany
A selective overview of the spectre of predomi-
nantly political activities of the first generation of  
Afghan refugees is displayed in Figure 2. One of the 
first public protests with more than 100 participants 
took place in the Bonn Hofgarten on 4 January 1980 
to protest against the Soviet military intervention 
that had occurred ten days earlier on 26/ 27 December 
1979 (interview, 16 July 2019). Two groups of Afghans 
in Germany had rallied their supporters; “Afghans 
living in Germany” of diverse backgrounds and the 
General Union of Afghan Students Abroad (GUAfS), 
each drawing about 350 persons. In the preparation 
stage of the rally both groups had not been able to 
agree on a joint protest but marched after one another 
to the Soviet embassy in Bad Godesberg (interview,  
5 November 2019; 700 Demonstranten fordern ....1980). 
Nevertheless, Afghans of diverse political background 
joined in, so did a substantial number of German  
protestors and onlookers, reportedly including 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher27  (interview, 19 September 
2019). The meetings ended with a joint finale at the 
Hofgarten.
The activities with the greatest impact were the 
opening of offices by the Mujahidin parties. These 
served as basis for all activities, i.e. lobbying German 
political parties and members of parliament, organis-
ing visits of party representatives and leaders from 
Afghanistan in Europe and West Germany28, publish-
ing information material about the particular party’s 
activities as well as front news and regular news 
about the situation in Afghanistan to inform its fol-
lowers (Dari/ Pashto editions) and the German public 
(German editions). Visits were not only organised 
from Afghanistan to Germany but also vice versa: 
HIG-representatives organised for famed journalist 
Peter Scholl-Latour and a camera team from Germany 
 
 
27 \  Genscher was Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs 
at that time.
28 \  All Islamist leaders paid visits to West Germany in the 1980s, most 
prominently Hekmatyar, Khales, Rabbani and Nabi. Their successful in 
accessing high-level German politicians and members of parliament 
varied. For example, the State Secretary in the Foreign Office, van Well, 
received Hekmatyar in 1981 (cf. Akten, 1981, pp. 137-141)), as did the 
Ministers of the State of Bavaria and the State of Baden Württemberg.
PEACEMAKING EFFORTS OF AFGHANS AND SYRIANS IN NRW AND GERMANY  \ E. MEININGHAUS & K. MIELKE
22 \ \ WORKING PAPER 11  \ 2019
Figure 2
Selected political activities of 1st generation Afghans in Germany from the 1980s onwards
1)  After the fall of the communist Najibullah 
regime in 1992, the mujahidin parties (Peshawar 
Seven) formed the ‘Islamic State of Afghanistan’ 
as outcome of the Peshawar Accord in April 1992. It 
became the recognised Government of Afghanistan 
(GoA) throughout the decade until end of 2001 
(Petersberg conference, see Box 1). The Taliban’s 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, formed in 1996 was 
not recognised by Germany (only by Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan and United Arab Emirates).
2) Revolutionary Group of the peoples of Afghanistan 
(splinter of Shola-ye javed) (Aachen 1974-83), SAMA 
(Organization for the liberation of the people of 
Afghanistan), 1979* (Hamburg), FAZA (Federation of 
Afghans and Afghan Students, splinter of GUAfS that 
reportedly broke up in 1973/4, i.e. after Mohammad 
Daud’s coup d’état that ousted the King and ended 
the monarchy, established in Aachen 1979), GUAfS 
(General Union of Afghan Students Abroad), 1972* in 
Bonn, with regional (sub)groups in various German 
cities, Democratic Union for Afghanistan (Aachen).
3) For example, on 11 January 1986 in Hamburg, 
organised by KUPFA e.V. in collaboration with 
Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker and Bureau Inter-
national Afghanistan (Paris). The Tribunal built on 
presentations of experts on Afghanistan and provided 
a forum to discuss the findings with members of 
parliament from all parties. They concluded that the 
Soviet Union commits genocide in Afghanistan and 
passed a resolution demanding the West German 
government and all other states to cut all diplomatic 
ties with and withdraw international recognition of 
the PDPA government in Afghanistan. See “Afghani-
stan Tribunal” (1986).
4) HELP e.V. (initiated by German parties in par-
liament/ Bundestag, 1983), Verein für Afghanische 
Flüchtlinge (VAF e.V.) aka Verein für Afghanistan-
förderung (VAF e.V.), Establishment of Islamic 
Centres of Afghans in different German cities, e.g. 
Munich, Hamburg, Essen; KUPFA e.v. (12/ 1979*) 
Hamburg (Committee for the support of political 
refugees in Afghanistan) aka KUPFA e.V.
5) Jahn (2019) points out that German politicians 
and parliament were aware of the Peshawar Seven’s 
control over refugee camps in Pakistan and that aid 
to refugees would benefit their fighters.
6) For example, with Rupert Neudeck’s Grünhelme 
(interview, 30 October 2019), Freundeskreis Afghan-
istan, or with Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker, Göt-
tingen, in publishing a joint special issue of pogrom 
(the society’s journal) and KUPFA’s Afghanistanblät-
ter or for conducting the Afghanistan-Tribunal in 
Hamburg on 11 January 1986 (“Afghanistan-Tribu-
nal”). Under the umbrella “Solidarity Committee 
with Afghanistan in Europe”, Bonner Afghanistan 
Komitee, HELP, GUAfS, FASA e.V., Freundeskreis 
Afghanistan e.V., F.A.F. Verein für Afghanische 
Flüchtlinge e.V. collaborated with like-minded 
international initiatives throughout Europe and the 
United States.
7)  KUPFA e.V., for example, ‘supported’ the Junge 
Union (JU), the youth branch of the German 
Christian Democratic Party (CDU), in organising an 
Afghanistan Festival in Hamburg in June 1985. The 
organisation’s head also persuaded Peter Maffay 
(a popular German artist) to join their cause of 
helping Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Maffay gave 
two charity concerts in Germany and visited refugee 
camps in Peshawar together with KUPFA-represent-
atives, thus helping to gain more public attention 
and donations.  
8) Individual initiative, see below
Source: Own compilation from interviews and partly from secondary literature and archival sources
Note: * Date of foundation (in footnotes)
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conference in the Gustav Stresemann-Institute in 
Bonn was going on, a group critical of this event  
organised a parallel event in the Gustav Heinemann 
Haus in Bonn-Tannenbusch. Similarly, protest rallies 
were staged on the same dates by Afghan groups of 
different political backgrounds, for example regularly 
on 28 December in the first half of the 1980s to pro-
test against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
and demand the Soviet troops’ withdrawal. Also,  
student groups and left-leaning groups of Afghans 
protested on several occasions against Islamic ex-
tremists, that is the existence and activities of the 
four radical Islamist parties and those of the so-called 
three traditional Islamists parties. Intimidation  
occurred, for example, between representatives of the 
latter and members of the General Union of Afghan 
Students Abroad (GUAfS). They even threatened each 
other and boycotted each other’s’ events. Most promi-
nently, different Afghan activists protested against 
the UN Talks on Afghanistan outside the gate to the  
Petersberg venue on the first day of the event on  
27 November. They articulated their disagreement with 
the selection and composition of the four delegations 
that had been invited to negotiate the formation of 
the political system in Afghanistan after the ousting 
of the  Taliban. In their view, the delegation members 
lacked large-scale legitimacy; above all due to the fact 
that they had been involved in leadership positions 
in the previous years of violent conflict. That is why 
they were now not trusted, labelled ‘warlords’ and 
deemed unfit to represent the different needs and in-
terests of the Afghan population in the country and 
abroad. 
Besides these public appearances, many of the  
Afghan groups published their own information bro-
chures from the late 1970s onwards. These prints were 
produced more or less professionally in the style of 
newsletters, bulletins, glossy journals, hand-written 
copies, etc. Before the space for deliberative discourse 
refugees (1982) and extend aid provision (especially 
food and medication) to Afghan resistance fighters 
(1984) (Deutscher Bundestag, 1982, 1984). One of the 
most successful impacts of campaigning (probably  
by several Afghan groups, though separately), was the 
public hearing on 18 and 19 March 198632  organised 
by the Foreign Policy Committee of the German  
Bundestag about the situation in Afghanistan.
Islamist parties and left-wing organisations  
recruited new members in Germany in the 1980s.
While the former offensively recruited in reception 
facilities for Afghan refugees arriving in Germany, the 
latter did this to a lesser extent but drew followers 
from organising protests or independent actions and 
via persuasion with the large number of publications 
they issued (see Figure 3).   
Within this wide range of activities over the 
years (displayed in Figure 2), followers from across 
the political spectrum have actively employed public 
outreach activities—either by editing publications in 
German, Pashto and Dari or by organising rallies and 
public protests. The competition between the differ-
ent factions (war inside the war in Afghanistan, com-
petition about access to political influence in Germa-
ny) is particularly evident in these activities and 
explained further below. However, it seems that occa-
sionally joint activities would happen (not necessarily 
planned as the spontaneous joining of the leftists’ 
affiliates with the rally of the Islamists on 4 January 
1980 showed). One reported example is the annual 
protest march to the Soviet embassy in Bad Godesberg 
on 27 December to mark the anniversary of the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan.
As concerns competition and rivalries, interviews 
show that on several occasions, conferences took 
place in parallel, for instance, the 1998 Rome confer-
ence of the pro-Monarchy Afghans (Rome group) and 
a meeting by a group of people of the so-called Cyprus 
group, roughly the same date. While the 1998 
32 \  Volker Neumann (1987) claimed that the hearing was initiated by his 
Social-Democratic Party (SPD).For a transcript of the parliamentary 
debate on the situation in Afghanistan (“Abgabe einer Erklärung der 
Bundesregierung Lage in Afghanistan”) the next day, 20 March 1986, 
see Plenarprotokoll 10/ 207, available:  https://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/
btp/10/10207.pdf (pp. 15894-15905). On later occasions, the German par-
liamentarians debated the situation in Afghanistan in their 125th ses-
sion on 16 February 1989. See Plenarprotokoll 11/ 125, retrieved from 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/11/11125.pdf#P.9186.
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Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Dr Mohammad 
Yusuf Khan and another initiative by a private person 
from Munich. 
Dr Yusuf Khan had been serving under King  
Zahir Shah and was the first Afghan prime minister 
who was not part of the royal family. He had received 
a PhD in chemistry in West Germany and also held 
an Ambassador posts in the Soviet Union before tak-
ing exile in Germany. In his self-understanding as a 
technocrat, he worked until his death in 1998 to find 
a peaceful solution for the Afghan conflict. Among other 
initiatives for a peace process in Afghanistan, he 
founded the Organisation for Strengthening of Unity 
and Struggle for the Liberation of Afghanistan (OSULA) 
with like-minded Afghans in Switzerland in 1980/81. 
Given that he had settled in Neuwied (Germany), the 
centre of OSULA-activities came to be Germany. Due 
to his charisma and the respect other Afghans had 
towards him because of his previous role in politics, 
in particular his ability to moderate reforms towards 
a modern government system,34  he was able to assem-
ble and unite many active Afghans around him. OSULA 
was not his only initiative, but the most formalised 
one, with an office run by volunteers in Bonn. His 
group attempted to bring the different conflict par-
ties to one table during different points in time. They 
started their activities as early as the 1980s during 
the communist Najibullah regime and always aimed 
at forming a technocratic government. Reportedly,  
Dr Yusuf saw the need to engage with all sides for 
talks; for instance, he had also written a letter to  
Soviet General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev. In the 
early 1990s, Dr Yusuf and other Afghans in Germany 
formed the “Afghan Peace Society”35  in an attempt  
 
 
34 \  The elaboration and putting into effect of the 1964 ‘liberal’ constitu-
tion fell into his tenure. The constitution limited the influence of the 
royal family, allowed parliamentary elections in 1965 and 1996, guaran-
teed education and a free press among other issues that were held dear 
ever after and perceived as legal bases that enabled social and political 
life in the following ‘Golden decade’ to thrive. The 1964 constitution 
served as basis for elaborating the post-2001 constitution, which was 
adopted by the Constitutional Loya Jirga appointees in January 2004.
35 \  The society was explicitly not founded as organisation or party to 
allow those who engaged in emergency relief and refugee aid (and for 
this had to remain ‘unpolitical’) to join the activities as well. Cf. inter-
view, 30 October 2019.
shifted to websites and Internet fora in the second 
half of the 1990s, the print issues provided the space 
for promoting the particular groups’ propaganda. The 
material addressed either the Afghans in Germany or 
Europe (in this case usually written in either Dari or 
Pashto) or the German public. In many cases, party 
offices, organisations, charities and so-called Afghan 
cultural centres served as editors for these informa-
tion and public relations materials.
The compilation of materials that were published 
in and distributed from NRW shows an unexpectedly 
high number of publications and, respectively, groups 
that edit and publish these (Figure 3).33  
The mentioned places of publishing give an idea 
of hotspots of Afghan exiles’ activities in North 
Rhine-Westphalia in the 1970s and 1980s. From the 
comments section in the Table (Figure 3) it can be 
gleaned that most publishing was more or less indi-
rectly related to the political upheavals in Afghanistan. 
It stimulated a tremendous amount of thinking,  
reflection and the subsequently perceived need to write 
about it. As a rule, the publications included, among 
other, press reviews from the German press, inter-
views (e.g. in refugee camps), reports about visits of 
like-minded individuals/ public persons from  
Afghanistan or reports from/ interviews with aid 
workers (e.g. medical doctors), by correspondents 
inside Afghanistan who wrote about resistance activ-
ities and conducted interviews (e.g. with witnesses of 
massacres), photos of mujahidin at their front bases, 
information about events, and not least donation 
appeals. 
Co-existence of formal peace processes and peace-
making from below
Some of these peacemaking initiatives, we will 
introduce in more detail below, as they highlight a 
unique kind of peacemaking agency Afghans in Ger-
many have exercised in the past, such as the initia-
tives around former Prime Minister (1963-65) and  
 
 
33 \  For a West Germany-wide overview of the publications see Gre-
vemeyer & Maiwand-Grevemeyer (1988). Journals, newspapers and 
other publications that ceased existence before 1978 are not included 
in the Table.
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Figure 3
Newspapers and other publications published by Afghans in NRW until 1988
1) Mentioned in interview, 16 July 2019 (not included in Grevemeyer & Maiwand-Grevemeyer, 1988).
Note: The overview is not comprehensive because it does not consider publications after 1988 and the follow-up of the existing 
ones as of that year. For more information on each of the publications, see Grevemeyer & Maiwand-Grevemeyer (1988). The 
Table mentions additional publications that the authors learned about in interviews conducted for this Paper.
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   \ that these factions start talking directly to  
negotiate for an end of the conflict among 
themselves, to end the war, without third party 
mediation, and to form a transitional ‘unity’ 
government (Article 3); 
   \ for outside powers to stop interfering in Afghan-
istan and respect the right to self-determina-
tion of the Afghan people (Article 4); 
   \ for the Afghans in Europe to establish a peace 
forum for ending the conflict and developing 
political solutions (Article 5); 
   \ that all armed foreigners, paramilitary units 
and military advisors leave the country as soon 
as possible (Article 8); 
   \ for the United N to abolish the sanction regime 
and instead impose an arms embargo on all 
conflict parties in Afghanistan and block supply 
lines for weapons (Article 11).
The fact that this event took place is astonishing 
in several respects. First, because the meeting was re-
alised by an individual in quasi-private capacity; sec-
ond, it took place in parallel to the official UN-process 
and a largely separate travel diplomacy of Zahir 
Shah’s sympathisers and emissaries in the region 
around Afghanistan. Third, in achieving a break-
through to some extent with Pakistan news outlets 
reporting on the meeting stressing the readiness of 
Rabbani, leader of the Islamic United Front/ North-
ern Alliance to enter into a coalition with the Taliban 
government as one outcome of the meeting.38  
The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 and sub-
sequent political events not only obsoleted all initia-
tives but—what is more—partially led to the with-
drawal of peace seekers in their engagement because 
of fears that they would be suspected of having links 
with ‘terrorists’. The interview material indicates 
that Afghans emphasise as much as they can the  
unpolitical nature of their activities in the post-2001 
period. This might have several reasons, such as the 
existing requirement by donors to be non-political to 
qualify for funding. However, interviews with later-  
 
 
 
38 \  In Pakistan, the Frontier Post, Pakistan Observer and The News repor-
ted on the Munich meeting on 28 August 2001.
to provide an umbrella format that could enhance 
mutual understanding of Afghans outside and inside 
Afghanistan (An interview with…, 1994, p. 8). Thereby, 
they set great hopes and expectations in the UN pro-
cess and invited UN-emissaries to their gatherings to 
exchange views (An interview with…, 1994, p. 9-10). 
Overall, OSULA backed the Rome Group around Zahir 
Shah and the King’s repetitive calls and attempts to 
mobilise for a Loya Jirga, first in 1983 (Rubin, 1989,  
p. 76) and again from 1998 onwards. However, formal 
activities of OSULA ceased and the organisation itself 
was largely dissolved after Dr Yusuf’s death in March 
1998. 
While the activities of Dr Yusuf and his followers 
and friends represent one example of ‘organised’ civic 
engagement among Afghans in Germany, this para-
graph describes an individual initiative to bring the 
conflict parties of Afghanistan to one table. Imam 
Sidigullah Fadai invited representatives of Afghan 
armed factions, intellectuals, former government offi-
cials, members of the Islamic Movement of Afghani-
stan, and party representatives for starting an inter- 
Afghan dialogue to end the war. The event took place 
at the Islamic Centre Munich from 24 to 26 August 
2001, less than three weeks before 11 September 2001. 
All major factions were represented, including from 
the Taliban; they were either present in person or 
joined discussions and addressed participants via 
telephone loudspeakers at the venue.36  The more 
than 100 participants in the conference arrived from  
Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates, Europe and 
the United States. Fadai had been living in Munich 
for 20 years and throughout maintained relations 
with Afghan political leaders in European exile. 
Those present on 26 August 2001, the last day of the 
conference, compiled the closure declaration37  of the 
meeting, which comprised 11 articles. Most signifi-
cantly, among other issues, the participants demanded 
   \ that all warring factions fully stop the violence, 
release prisoners of war and allow humanitari-
an aid to be delivered (Article 2); 
36 \  Reportedly, the Taliban Foreign Minister Mutawakil, Northern Alli-
ance leader Rabbani, Sayyaf, Mojaddedi, and Hekmatyar addressed the 
conference. Interviews, 13 and 16 February 2019; cf. “Afghan factions 
urged…”, 2001; “Grausame Unterdrücker”, 2001.
37 \  The press release for the event with a copy of the declaration’s eleven 
points is with the authors.
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Box 1
The 2001 “UN Talks on Afghanistan” at the Petersberg in Königswinter near Bonn1 (Track 1)
Date: 27 November–5 December 2001
Participants: Rome Group (8 delegates plus 3 advisors), Peshawar Group (3 delegates, 2 advisors), Cyprus Group (3 delegates,  
2 advisors), Islamic United Front (aka Northern Alliance with 8 delegates and 3 advisors), UN-team of 11 led by Lakhdar Brahimi 
(Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan), and representatives of 18 countries with observer status at the 
conference
Organisation: UN office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan
On the one side, the so-called 2001-Bonn Conference on Afghanistan brought together the representatives of the party coalition 
(Northern Alliance) that had resisted the Taliban in a long stand-off since the second half of the 1990s and by the time of the 
start of the conference had ousted the Taliban and their political followers from government and other offices of relevance and 
occupied Kabul with its own forces with the help of the international military intervention. On the other, Afghans from different, 
predominantly elite, backgrounds who either supported a prominent role for the ex-King (Rome Group) or had taken exile in 
Pakistan (Peshawar Group) or Iran (Cyprus Group) took part.2  The Taliban were not included, invited or even considered to be 
part of this conference because they were understood as ousted and defeated. A fifth delegation of pro-democratic forces, that is 
five groups that had also established relations with the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) in Kabul previ-
ously, were also not allowed to take part in the conference.3   
Proceedings: The agenda of the talks consisted of two major components: (1) measures to determine the path of transition in 
terms of structure and duration, including the formation of the interim administration and plans for a so-called Emergency 
Loya Jirga, and (2) security measures to end violent conflict and ensure security for the population. With strong US-pressure, the 
delegates agreed on Hamid Karzai (affiliated with the Rome Group but absent from the conference) to become interim head of 
state4  of Afghanistan until the Emergency Loya Jirga in 18 months’ time would determine the official administration. The Rome 
Group was made up of Afghans who lived in Germany, for example Mir Mohammed Amin Farhang, Professor of Economics at 
Bochum University, who was appointed Minister for Reconstruction in the interim cabinet. 
Result: Cabinet posts agreed upon in the meeting were distributed as follows: 17 for the Islamic United Front, nine for the Rome 
Group and four for the Peshawar Group. The Cyprus Group refused to accept cabinet posts at this stage.5 
1 \  The official website of the conference includes detailed further information, see: https://www.unric.org/de/frieden-und-sicherheit/26328 [accessed 
18 November 2019].
2 \  The designation of two groups of delegates as Peshawar Group and Cyprus Group is misleading given that – just as the Rome Group and the North-
ern Alliance – they are not homogeneous. However, there is reason to assume that both groups have more or less been artificially created – with in-
fluence by the UN – to create the impression that Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries and the refugee population therein are being represented 
indirectly. Cf. interviews, 5 June and 5 August 2019. Francesc Vendrell, the Personal Representative of Lakhdar Brahimi (SRSG) and head of UNSMA 
had held intensive talks in Kabul in the two weeks preceding the conference and agreed on the format of four delegations taking part. However, the 
choice of the delegates was reportedly to be decided within the delegations. As Ahmad Fawzi, Spokesman for the SRSG for Afghanistan, said in a 
press conference at Königswinter on 25 November 2001, “… the UN is not imposing any choices on the Afghan parties. The choice of the delegates is 
entirely up to them. We are not asking them to send one or the other. We are asking them to send groups that are representative and that can take 
decisions.” See “Press Briefing by…”, 25 November 2001, p. 3. Retrieved from https://www.unric.org/html/german/afghanistan/talks/pb25nov.pdf
3 \  According to Thomas Ruttig, then political officer of UNSMA and personal aid of Francesc Vendrell, the groups had been officially invited but in last 
minute denied access as regular participants and were merely granted observer status (Ruttig 2006, p. 16). For an overview of the groups, see Ruttig, 
2006, pp. 16-17).
4 \  Although not in the agenda and to largely everybody’s surprise, Karzai addressed the participants and diplomatic observers at the opening of the 
conference via phone from southern Afghanistan during the public opening ceremony when German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and the 
international press were present. See the agenda here: https://www.unric.org/html/german/afghanistan/talks/agenda.pdf and published content of 
Karzai’s statement with quotes for press available at https://www.unric.org/html/german/afghanistan/talks/karzai.pdf
5 \  After the conference, one member of the Cyprus delegation was assigned to a cabinet post. Delegates who took part as members of the Peshawar 
Group maintained three posts.
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It is important to mention that several protests were 
held by Afghan political groups and movements that 
were not included in the UN Talks and neither in the 
Track-2 event (see below). The protestors criticised 
the selection of participants at the UN-event, that is 
the exclusion of democratic forces and the inclusion 
of mujahidin commanders whom they blamed for 
their earlier engagement in the civil war and the ina-
bility to form a government after the Soviet Union’s 
withdrawal from Afghanistan (see Figure 2). 
Parallel to the UN Track 1-talks, a Track 2-event 
was organised as a shorter but complementary Afghan 
Civil Society Meeting (Box 2) from 29 November to 
2 December 2001. Here, Afghans from the near abroad, 
i.e. Pakistan, Iran and Dubai, were in the majority. 
The meeting served as a platform from where swis-
speace established the Afghan Civil Society Forum 
from 2002 onwards. 
In sum, this section shows the difference between 
formal processes and initiatives launched by private 
persons. 
generations Afghans, in particular youth, showed that 
young Afghans in North Rhine-Westphalia felt highly 
stigmatised and perceived as suspects and ‘terrorists’ 
in the aftermath of 9-11. This led them to mobilise to 
raise awareness about political differences (inter-
views, 15 March 2019, 28 October 2019). In the after-
math of 9-11, two major ‘peace’ events concerning  
Afghanistan took place in NRW. 
Accordingly, at a closer look, the UN Talks on  
Afghanistan were no peace negotiations as such, and 
Afghans living in Germany did not initiate them nor 
did they have a particular share in either event in 
contrast to Afghans from other exile countries in the 
far and near abroad (assembled in the so-called Cyprus- 
and Peshawar delegations). In the UN-organised, po-
litically US-dominated and Germany-hosted Peters-
berg conference (Box 1) of 28 November to 5 December 
2001, only two Afghans who lived in NRW39  at the 
time made it into the four delegations of participants. 
39 \  Another two participants had graduated from Bochum and Köln  
University with a PhD degree at an earlier point in time.
Box 2
Afghan civil society meeting in Bad Honnef (Track 2)1
Date: 29 November-2 December 2001
Participants: except for three people, all Afghan participants came from abroad, i.e. Pakistan (48), Iran (5), Europe/ United States 
(13) and Dubai (10 traders) (in total 31 female and 45 male); selection process of the participants was ad hoc, days before the  
meeting began.
Organisation: swisspeace and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
Proceedings: Civil society actors chose topics for discussion in six working groups on education, reconstruction, human rights, 
constitution, security, and women’s issues. According to the organisers’ final report on the civil society meeting (see Schmeidl, 
2002)2 , the civil society actors had expressed more than once that they “did not see the actors on Petersberg as legitimate. They 
were only there due to holding power through weapons and territory, but not because they were wanted” (p. 3). 
Linking Track 1 and 2: After the group was visited by Lakhdar Brahimi and Zalmay Khalilzad early on, when discussion had not 
really begun, a civil society delegation was formed from among the participants and received at the UN Talks on Afghanistan, 
however reportedly only by third-tier members of the delegation in the ‘political’ conference. 
Result: The Bad Honnef participants interacted with the political actors at the Petersberg, and the German Minister for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and members of parliament from the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The meeting was deemed to 
have jump-started ‘civil society involvement in the Afghan peace and reconstruction process’ and carried a high symbolic value. 
Its work focused on four main activities. Besides networking, coordination and information exchange, the most important activ-
ities were to link civil society with the official peace process, that is to establish a durable link between Track 2 (civil society) and 
Track 1 (diplomatic and reconstruction efforts by state actors).
1 \  cf. Reber & Schmeidl (2002).
2 \  Internal report; used with the permission of swisspeace.
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counted barely a few hundred members among a 
population of five million. Overall, political parties 
with greater following in Syria had only just begun to 
emerge, but parliament was abolished. When it was 
reintroduced formally in 1972 under Hafiz al-Asad, 
parliament factually exercised no power and only 
functioned to approve of laws initiated by the presi-
dent (Perthes, 1995; George, 2003). The number of seats 
in parliament were fixed, and the Ba’th held more 
than the absolute majority, so that elections, which 
were openly controlled by security forces, would only 
serve to fill the seats. Among the political parties  
permitted in the so-called National Progressive Front 
were the Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Move-
ment (today: National Covenant Party), the Arab  
Socialist Union and the Socialist Unionists (Seale, 1990, 
pp. 175-76).41  The Muslim Brotherhood was banned in 
1963, and due to its continued attempts at organising 
resistance, including assassinations and armed at-
tacks against Ba’thist officials and military forces, it 
was outlawed in 1980. After Hamah (1982), it has 
largely ceased activities inside Syria. Political engage-
ment outside the Ba’th and the larger Front parties 
primarily meant to face persecution. For two genera-
tions of Syrians, “elections” mean having to cast their 
vote under the eyes and in the presence of intelli-
gence personnel facing the threat of beatings for a 
“wrong” vote, and not having experienced freedom of 
assembly. Even establishing a non-political civil soci-
ety association has required ministerial and intelli-
gence approval, triggered extensive surveillance of all 
persons involved and their families and friends, and 
thus remained very limited. In theory, a number of 
other political parties have continued to exist; how-
ever, where these actually worked on political pro-
grammes, their members have repeatedly faced arrest, 
while other parties have merely existed on paper. 
Despite grave risks, an internal opposition con-
tinued to exist over the decades before the war, but it 
remained limited to very small circles mainly based 
in some of the cities (Lund, 2012). After Bashar al-Asad 
came to power in 2000, a brief period of alleged open-
ness towards “reform” by the regime initially led to 
 
41 \  These were expanded in 2005 by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
Syrians: A struggle for politics
Grassroots mobilisation: Opposition politics inside 
and outside of Syria
Unlike in Afghanistan, where diverse political 
groups established themselves in the underground 
between 1964 and 1978, this was not the case in Syria 
before 2011. Especially before the war, any form of po-
litical engagement outside the Ba’th party primarily 
meant to face an existential threat to a person’s life 
and the well-being of their family. Extensive surveil-
lance among the general population has been on a 
scale comparable to the former German Democratic 
Republic, including monitoring of phone calls, the 
mail, and in later years the Internet, as well as 
through a wide network of informants. Syria could be 
a good place to live—but only if one endorsed state 
propaganda and performed the rituals thereof as  
required, staying clear of voicing criticism, let alone 
engaging in oppositional politics (Wedeen, 2015;  
Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016). Almost all intellec-
tuals, human rights lawyers and politically engaged 
individuals who sought to develop alternative visions 
of democratic reform, civil rights, minority rights 
and a more independent judiciary before the war 
spent years and often decades of their lives in prison. 
This includes the full spectrum of politics from Com-
munists to the Muslim Brotherhood—whether they 
were actual members or accused thereof.40  Trials 
against “dissidents” in Syria are largely held behind 
closed doors, (often false) forced confessions are ob-
tained through torture. The rule of law does not exist. 
From children to adults, many Syrians have grown  
up to fear the state, its officials, and the mukhabarat 
(intelligence). In Syria as in Germany, political en-
gagement outside regime ‘politics’ was hence rare 
and has been characterised by a sense of extreme 
danger and fear.
Since 1963, Syria has de facto been a one-party 
state, and political parties had been outlawed before 
several times already. When in that year, a group of 
military officers came to power in a military coup 
and declared the regime to be Ba’thist, the Ba’th party 
 
40 \  With law no. 49 in 1980, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood  
became a capital crime punishable by death (George, 2003, p. 92).
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Privately-initiated political engagement for peace 
among Syrians in NRW and Germany
In line with these developments, political 
engagement for peace among Syrians in Germany 
mainly began around 2011. Inside Syria, political  
rallies, now often including the younger generation, 
required protesters to organise while the military 
was deployed across the country. Mass arrests began, 
and security forces attempted to crush protests  
(Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2013; Amnesty Interna-
tional, 2016). Political self-organisation did emerge  
after decades of inertia and silence (Yassin-Kassab & 
Al-Shami, 2016; Abboud, 2016). In many places, civil-
ian local coordination committees (LCCs) were 
formed to organise protests. They created social media 
networks, passed on reports and blogs also to the in-
ternational media, while others formed armed groups 
on the regime and the opposition side, initially often 
as neighbourhood watches. With the war deepening, 
LCCs often took over the task of distributing humani-
tarian aid in opposition-controlled areas and taking 
on administrative responsibilities for services, re-
pairs and other tasks previously carried out by gov-
ernment bodies. The increasing militarisation of the 
war and the rise of Islamist groups from 2014 onwards, 
as well as the Russian military intervention in sup-
port of the regime in autumn 2015, however, led to a 
severe decrease of the space for emerging oppositional 
politics (Saleh, 2017; Khoury, 2013). The opposition lost 
ground militarily against the Russia-supported regime 
(including the Russian Air Force), Iranian troops 
(Revolutionary Guards), and fighters from the Lebanese 
Hezbollah. Although the armed opposition has re-
ceived support in weapons, ammunition and the pay-
ment of salaries primarily by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France, this 
never included aerial support, and especially the halt 
of US-support in 2018 led to territorial losses except 
for the governorate of Idlib and the Kurdish north. 
The UN Security Council has remained blocked for 
international intervention against the regime and its 
allies, which for now seems to render the prospects of 
political change slim at least in the short-term. After 
hopes for more leeway, which were quickly disap-
pointed. Most signatories of the Declaration of the 
1000, a statement which became a rallying point for 
those advocating for political reform during the so-
called Damascus Spring in 2001, were threatened and 
imprisoned shortly thereafter. Four years later, the 
Damascus Declaration signalled an attempted to  
create a longer-lasting umbrella group for political 
engagement outside the Front. The regime kept a 
close watch on its signatories , and many faced arrest 
and imprisonment. 
If among Afghans, the situation inside Afghani-
stan was mirrored by their engagement in Germany, 
so did the situation of Syrians in Germany reflect the 
highly repressive dictatorship inside Syria and its  
oppression of any form of oppositional politics. For 
Syrians who left the country during these years for 
professional reasons, engagement in oppositional 
politics was no option even when living abroad  
because they were aware of the reach of the regime. 
Many maintained the relationship with their wider 
family inside Syria, where the police state meant  
surveillance of phone calls and letters, especially for 
those with connections abroad (Ismail, 2018). Engag-
ing in oppositional activities would have put their  
remaining family inside Syria at risk of intimidation 
and interrogation or worse by the mukhabarat, and 
they would have forfeited their possibility to return. 
While Syrians who were members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and who had fled the country or were 
expelled did come to Germany with an alternative 
political vision, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria  
itself ceased to work in 1982. Leftists who lived abroad 
often also maintained close contact among each other, 
but generally they would not advocate for alternative 
politics openly because hardly anyone could have af-
forded to openly voice their support. For these reasons, 
Syrian oppositional politics were a non-subject for 
most inside Syria pre-2011, and also for many of those 
who lived in Germany.
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and medical sites (United Nations General Assembley, 
2017). The Turkish invasions and offensives in north- 
western Syria in December 2018 (Afrin) and the 
north-east since October 2019 have also prompted 
large protests in different cities in Germany. In both 
cases, the Turkish military has deemed the Kurdish 
YPG (Yekineyen Parastina Gel, People’s Protection 
Units), which in an alliance with Arab fighters from 
the area form the Syrian Democratic Forces that con-
trolled one-third of Syrian territory until November 
2019, a terrorist organisation due to its alleged links 
with the Turkey-based PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdis-
tane, Kurdistan Workers’ Party). Furthermore, the  
association Families for Freedom e.V. has organised 
political rallies in Berlin, among other places, to raise 
awareness of the dire situation of an estimated 
98,000 Syrians who, after having been arrested “have 
been forcibly disappeared” in Syria since March 2011 
(Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2019). Since their 
arrests, their whereabouts have not been known to 
their families; authorities refuse to disclose their 
whereabouts, and many have since been murdered 
(Amnesty InternationaI, 2015, 2016). 
These rallies are significant in that they achieved 
to mobilise Syrians in Germany to continue to raise 
public awareness of the war, which is now in its 
eighth year, and help to maintain a feeling of solidarity 
and mutual support. While these represent grassroots 
initiatives calling for peace, they are not formally 
aligned with any political group or official peace  
processes. This connection is more immediate for the 
Berlin-based association Families for Freedom, founded 
by a number of Syrian mothers, sisters and wives 
whose loved ones have been disappeared. They have 
created the so-called Freedom Bus: A two-level red 
bus with 100 picture frames of disappeared persons 
that serves as a monument, and around which their 
protests are organised—also elsewhere in Europe. 
Over several years, Families for Freedom petitioned 
for the Special Envoys in the UN-led Geneva peace 
process to include the release of detainees and clari-
fying the fate of those who “have been disappeared” 
into the agendas of negotiating rounds (interview  
25 February 2019). Until Geir Pederson assumed office 
many had hoped that war atrocities would be followed 
by justice and political change might be a real possi-
bility due to significant gains until 2015, when Russia 
entered the war, many research participants now  
describe deep-seated disappointment, feelings of loss 
and severe fatigue.
The engagement of Syrians in Germany partly 
mirrors these experiences, but in parts, it also differs 
significantly. In principle, the most distinctive char-
acteristic is that even among Syrians in Germany, 
throughout the war, the fear of persecution, for loved 
ones inside Syria and the fear to not be able to return 
has continued to reverberate. First, this is reflected in 
the fact that most newly founded associations among 
Syrians since 2011 are humanitarian (collecting winter 
clothes, supporting hospitals inside Syria, etc.), devel-
opmental (supporting education initiatives inside 
Syria, etc.), or aim to support newly arriving Syrian 
refugees in Germany and provide help in their daily 
life here. Most associations focused on humanitarian, 
development and integration initiatives, while only 
few have worked on advocacy and political topics 
(Ragab & Katbeh, 2017, p. 20).
According to research participants in Germany, 
from 2011 onwards, mainly those who identified with 
the opposition began organising protests and speak-
ing to the media to raise awareness of the developing 
crisis. Compared to the growing number of Syrians 
who had arrived in Germany, participation in political 
rallies remained low and this largely out of persistent 
fear. However, private organisers, among them Syrians, 
German intellectuals and others, as well as associations 
did organise protests that brought together between 
about 100 and up to several thousand protesters in 
many cities across Germany. Protests have taken 
place primarily as a plea for awareness and support 
during times of major regime offensives, such as the 
assault by Syrian, Russian and allied Iranian and 
Hezbollah forces on Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city 
that had largely been under opposition control since 
2012, in December 2016. The United Nations later con-
demned the offensive for war crimes committed, in-
cluding the use of chemical weapons, deliberate  
attacks on civilians and humanitarian relief workers 
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the opposition. Although many of these associations 
joined the Dachverband Deutsch-Syrischer Hilfsvereine 
e.V. (umbrella organisation for German–Syrian aid  
associations) founded in 2013 as a coordinating body, 
underlying political disagreements have hindered 
the Dachverband from condemning attacks inside 
Syria publicly, for instance. Among those who arrived 
from 2011 onwards, it has mainly been young women 
and men who founded more politically orientated  
associations. For the initial years, research participants 
describe a greater sense of mutual help among those 
who newly arrived, which over time, however, has 
been noted to have faded. Among associations, which 
receive little financial support especially for political 
work among Syrians inside Germany, this is partially 
seen as a result of a newly emerging “business men-
tality”—the need for initiatives to survive and attract 
funding. Many activists assumed full-time studies 
and jobs, thus were facing time constraints as well as 
the additional problem of persistent mistrust and 
fear among Syrians. There is also a sense of betrayal 
stemming from the older generation’s silence. One  
research participant brought to the point a sense that 
was shared in several interviews when noting that 
“while the early generation of Syrians in Germany did 
not hinder us in our engagement and in our revolu-
tion, they failed to support us”. Representatives of the 
earlier generation with a history of resistance stated 
that they withheld their support out of hopelessness 
and disillusionment; in one case, somebody who had 
formerly identified with the Muslim Brotherhood 
told another research participant that “our revolution 
already ended 30 years ago” (interview, 7 November 
2019). Equally, there is a strong sense that circum-
stances have changed, and many research participants 
stressed that the demands and achievements post-
2011 differ from those of the 1980s especially in the 
country-wide scale of protests, which have mobilised 
Syrians from all age groups and backgrounds.
Syrians quickly became very active in  organising 
hands-on support inside Syria, by organising protests, 
liaising with international media, documenting vio-
lations, replacing state government structures in areas 
which came under the control of oppositional forces 
as the Special UN Envoy for Syria in early 2019, this plea 
was continuously rejected. It has since then received 
greater public attention, however, neither the United 
Nations nor the official, internationally recognised 
opposition body, the Syrian Negotiation Commission 
(see below), possess the means to pressurise the  
regime into concessions.
Syrians have more rarely also founded associa-
tions which are outspokenly political or offer plat-
forms for political discussions among Syrians. The 
earliest such initiatives in Germany began in 2013, 
but in fact, many only orientated their work towards 
Syrians in Germany after working with partners in-
side Syria became increasingly difficult, and hopes for 
regime change became scarce around 2016 (especially 
with the regime recapturing Aleppo, and subsequently 
the Syrian south). The aim of these initiatives, many 
of which actually continue to also work inside Syria 
where possible, is to support Syrians in participating 
in German politics, to enable discussions about what 
an alternative future for Syria may look like, and to 
learn about different forms of political systems and 
civic participation after having come from a regime 
where political education was restricted to state 
propaganda and critical thinking was not permitted.
Unlike Afghan activities, these initiatives are by 
and large not launched by persons of first-generation 
immigrants with a long history of peacemaking en-
gagement but by younger women and men. Indeed, 
research participants stressed that the identified 
three generations of Syrians have hardly connected. 
Before 2011, Syrians in Germany who did join some 
form of groups were part of the so-called Freundschafts- 
kreise (circles of friends), which existed in most cities, 
but most of which did not reach out to others after 
2011. The Bonn group, based around the former Syrian 
embassy from the times when Bonn was the German 
capital (until 1990) is still known as pro-regime (in-
terview, 15 November 2019). Some members of these 
Freundschaftskreise later founded humanitarian or-
ganisations, for instance, which formally should be 
politically neutral. Yet in reality this is not the case: 
Some groups would deliver aid into regime-controlled 
areas, whereas others focused on areas controlled by 
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Figure 4
List of rallies on Syria in Germany (selected)
Source: Own compilation 
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Among their political engagement activities, Impact 
brought together Syrian activists in March 2017. Also, 
their project MPs2030 aims to provide political educa-
tion through workshops to young Syrians in Germany 
(18-30 years on federalism, political parties, etc.). 
Their aim is to enable young Syrians to become more 
politically active in Germany, and ideally to enable 
them to run for parliamentary elections by 2030. 
Founded in 2013 by Syrians and Germans, Hiwarat e.V. 
(formerly: Friedenskreis Syrien e.V) has equally 
launched several projects supporting dialogue among 
Syrians in Germany to enable political discussions 
and an alternative vision for peace in the longer-term 
future also inside Syria. One project is a regular round 
table on transitional justice, diversity, and feelings of 
powerlessness regarding the situation in the country. 
“Peace between here and there” was a project based 
in Berlin where Syrian women met to discuss their 
experiences of having to flee from home, of violence 
and hope, which often remain silenced. To help voice 
their fears and hopes and to enable exchange with 
non-Syrians in Berlin, participants in this project 
together with the Syrian writer and artist Kefah Ali 
Deeb put their experiences into words and stories 
in writing workshops. Later, the authors read their 
stories in public readings. Another population group 
which the initiators of the Hiwarat e.V. identified in 
need of support to become more socially and politi-
cally integrated and active are persons above the age 
of 40. For these, the Hiwarat e.V. is currently running 
a project “Engagement for all age groups”, where par-
ticipants can choose which topics they would like to 
engage in more (e.g. experiences of discrimination 
and alienation in Germany, active participation). For 
each session, a participant prepares an introductory 
talk, which is then opened for discussion; at times, 
also external presenters can be invited (interview,  
8 November 2019). Furthermore, “Young Leaders for 
Syria” is a project that was founded by the Syrian as-
sociation Citizen Diplomats for Syria e.V., a group of 
former Syrian diplomats who deserted from diplo-
matic service, as well as Hiwarat e.V. and The European 
Foundation for Democracy. Its aim is to support  
reconstruction in Syria through exile communities. 
and initiating a lively civil society which had previ-
ously been unthinkable. Yet amid the continuous 
pressure of war and after decades of repression, what 
has not emerged are groups or parties with actual  
political programmes, which could be appealing to a 
wide range of Syrians, and which could run for elec-
tions and actual state reform from within. In Germany, 
few newly founded associations have tried to slowly 
begin filling this gap, as they regard an open and 
honest exchange of political views, civic and political 
education as the first step towards longer-term alter-
natives to the current regime. 
Among the associations founded since 2011, Adopt 
a Revolution e.V. was established by Syrians and  
Germans initially to support numerous projects in-
side Syria—including support to LCCs. In more recent 
years, Adopt a Revolution have also worked with Syrians 
in Germany, often those who had previously been  
active inside Syria. For example, in the project “Talking 
about the Revolution”, Syrians travel across Germany 
to speak to the interested public—be they political 
parties, church groups, or adult education centres—
about the Syrian war to create awareness of their his-
tory and experiences. This project offers training for 
participants in storytelling, and it brings together  
activists from different places in Germany to meet and 
connect. Addressing younger participants, “Visions-
4Syria” is a youth camp which Adopt a Revolution ran 
in 2018 to facilitate discussions about how Syrian  
refugees could participate in Germany politically, and 
how they envisage a future in Syria. Furthermore, 
their project “Repression, Opposition, Revolution—
DDR and Syria” brings together Syrians and former 
dissidents of former East Germany based on their 
shared experience of fighting dictatorship. Together, 
they travel to those areas in Germany with a strong 
right-wing AfD42  presence to discuss their mutual  
experiences in the struggle against authoritarianism 
and nationalism (interview, 25 November 2019). 
Equally based in Berlin, Impact e.V. is a Syrian 
association which focusses on civil society research 
and development. Similarly to Adopt a Revolution, it 
originally worked primarily with partners inside Syria, 
and more recently also supports Syrians in Germany. 
42 \  “Alternative for Germany”; right-wing populist political party.
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charismatic figures from the pre-war period; rather, 
the new generation appears to be forming an identity 
of their own. We thus find a somewhat mixed picture: 
Those who are willing to engage politically and those 
who remain “the silent majority”, while on both sides, 
we find at least five major political currents among 
Syrians in Germany: 1) those who support the regime, 
2) those who tolerate it as they see no alternative, and 
among the opposition 3) secularists/Leftists, 4) Islam- 
oriented strands, and 5) the newly emerging genera-
tion, whose identity as a ‘group’ is still only emerging. 
Ethnically and religiously, all of these groups are 
diverse. This diversity (religiously and politically) is 
true also for Syrian Kurds who represent their own 
case due to their longstanding discrimination by the 
Syrian regime and their quasi-state of autonomy in 
northern Syria between 2012 and late 2019. Although 
Syrian Kurds tend to lean towards a Leftist orientation 
and often saw themselves as part of the opposition as 
well, the history of Kurdish resistance inside Syria 
with the Arab opposition has been a point of conten-
tion, which is increasingly reflected among Syrians in 
Germany as well. From the perspective of many Arab 
Syrians, the dominating Kurdish group in northern 
Syria (PYD/YPG) entered a non-attack agreement 
with the Syrian regime early in the war and fought 
with the US-International Alliance against the so-
called Islamic State (IS), instead of joining active 
fighting against the regime. Many Arab Syrians have 
perceived this as a betrayal. In turn, many Syrian 
Kurdish groups stress they suffered a long history of 
prosecution and discrimination by the regime, and 
therefore made it a condition vis-à-vis the Arab oppo-
sition groups that they acknowledge minority rights 
as a matter of priority for forming an alternative  
political agenda. Politically, Syrian Kurds are divided 
between those who support the PYD and/or PKK, and 
those in opposition to PYD/PKK—some of whom 
identify with Kurdish political parties that form part 
of the Kurdish National Council (KNC). Further, there 
are groups that support a “third way” (e.g. Syria’s  
Tomorrow Movement, Kurdish Future Movement) 
(Koontz, 2019), and lastly those who distance them-
selves from Kurdish politics. Formally, only the KNC 
Similarly, the Democratic Society Center e.V. founded 
in Aachen in 2019 has organised for Syrian students 
to visit the parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia.  
In this manner, its initiators hope to enable Syrian 
students to learn more about their civil rights in 
Germany, about the German political system, and to 
enable a personal exchange with parliamentarians 
(interview, 15 November 2019).
All of these initiatives are mainly run by young 
Syrians who arrived in Germany after 2011, and who 
believe that any remaining hopes for change and an 
alternative to the persistent dictatorship requires a 
long-term approach to enabling political dialogue 
and participation among Syrians abroad where this 
is possible. For their founders, encouraging Syrians to 
join these initiatives has often proven difficult. Many 
research participants state that even after having left 
Syria, many Syrians feel cautious and try to keep 
their distance from Syrians outside their own initia-
tive and family. Indeed, continuous resistance and war 
have not meant that the threat by the Syrian security 
apparatus even for Syrians abroad has stopped. On 
the contrary, in Germany as elsewhere, cases have 
been reported where protesters were filmed by re-
gime supporters and whose family members who 
had remained inside Syria were subsequently identi-
fied, threatened and arrested (AI, 2011; Gebauer, 2012). 
Others try to maintain a low profile to protect the 
chance to see remaining family inside Syria and keep 
silent out of fear of arrest in case they return (inter-
views 28 October 2017, 2 October 2018, 25 January 2019, 
15 November 2019). To many, political resistance has 
appeared to become unfeasible, and distrust charac-
terises the atmosphere among Syrian initiatives 
within Germany for many as they fear that other  
Syrians might be agents of the regime. 
In sum, compared to the high number of Syrians 
in Germany, few associations of Syrians in Germany 
have taken up political engagement for peace, and so 
far, fear and fatigue are among those factors which 
impede their efforts. Unlike in the Afghan experience, 
their efforts are centred around Berlin as the current 
capital rather than Bonn, and their engagement is 
less characterised by strong linkages to independent 
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when the United Nations intensified its involvement 
in 2014. Strikingly, prior UN-engagement involved 
conferences with external states, but with hardly any 
Syrian participation, as in the case of Geneva I (June 
2012) (Hinnebusch & Zartman, 2016). Formal peace 
processes have mainly occurred in the UN-led Geneva 
peace processes (cf. Box 3), which have so far entailed 
eight rounds of negotiations since 2012, and the com-
peting Astana and Sochi talks convened by Russia, 
Iran and Turkey in 14 rounds since January 2017.43
Syrian-led peace initiatives were weakened by 
the fact that many had to flee the country to build 
their lives in different cities around the world, which 
has further complicated the organic, coherent emer-
gence of oppositional politics. Instead, dozens of 
small groups with limited membership have 
emerged especially among the civil opposition. These 
at times joined larger umbrellas which were subse-
quently internationally recognised as “the opposition”: 
The Syrian National Council established in Istanbul, 
Turkey, in August 2011, the Syrian National Coalition 
(the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Op-
position Forces) founded in Doha, Qatar, in November 
2012, the Higher Negotiation Committee created in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in December 2015 and the Syrian 
Negotiation Commission as its successor since Janu-
ary 2019. In each transition from one umbrella to the 
next, the former umbrella formally continued to exist, 
but some members resigned and others were added 
to form a new umbrella. Many opposition groups, and 
especially Syria’s intellectuals, have kept their dis-
tance from these formal processes.
The only official representation of the formally 
recognised Syrian opposition in Germany are two 
bodies: The Syrian National Coalition with its Berlin 
office, since 2015 as part of the Syrian Negotiation 
Commission, and the Kurdish National Council office 
also based in Berlin. However, research participants 
have frequently expressed that they do not see them-
selves represented by either of these bodies nor in the 
larger Geneva processes. In some cases, German policy 
and political foundations have facilitated meetings 
which were meant to feed into formal peacemaking. 
For example, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
43 \  The following Box 3 focusses on Geneva because it has been the 
longer-lasting, more diverse of these processes.
has at times had a limited representation in the  
Geneva peace processes. Despite the PYD’s territorial 
control through YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF), Turkey has exercised international pressure to 
exclude it from the peace processes due to its reported 
PKK links.
As a reflection of these developments, even 
among those Syrians who identify with the opposi-
tion, many worry and try to keep their distance from 
each other. As the example of Afghanistan shows, 
however, Afghans in Germany from across a broad  
political spectrum have remained engaged for dec-
ades in peacemaking in Afghanistan and built  
networks of support in Germany. An open question 
hence is to what extent the present fatigue among 
Syrians may give room to the re-emergence of  
engagement in the longer-term future.
Coexistence of formal peace processes and peace-
making from below
Among both civil opposition groups which did 
continue to work inside Syria, often in secrecy, before 
the war and those which emerged since 2011, some 
have sought to become part of Syrian peace processes. 
With the war progressing, this has also included 
newly emerged armed opposition groups. Especially 
in the first months and years of the war, influential 
Syrians inside the country as well as abroad launched 
several broad-based peace initiatives and national 
dialogue forums. In Germany, the associations who 
engage in political dialogue for peace mentioned 
above do not formally form part of formal peace  
processes. Outside these initiatives, only in very rare 
cases do individuals from NRW and elsewhere in  
Germany participate in these processes as individuals. 
This was the case, for example, in a Syrian-initiated 
gathering of many opposition groups from inside and 
outside Syria as well as influential Syrian individuals 
which took place in May/June 2012 in Antalya, as well 
as meetings within Syrian opposition groups in Cairo 
in late 2011/early 2012 (interviews, 23 February 2018,  
15 April 2018). While in the early months and years in 
particular, such initiatives inside Syria and outside 
were still strongly Syrian-led, this largely changed 
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permitted to join, which, as they assume, may have 
been due to pressure by the Turkish government not 
to allow Kurdish individuals to participate (inter-
views 15 April 2018, 5 October 2019).
Consequently, Syrian political engagement and 
involvement in peace initiatives in Germany has 
been severely constrained by a continuous fear of per-
secution and harm to family members inside Syria. 
While militarily, the regime has gained the upper 
hand since the Russian intervention, the UN-mediated 
peace processes in Geneva have not at any point 
made significant progress in achieving a political set-
tlement. Many Syrians who fled the country describe 
how they had felt enormous enthusiasm, relief and 
hope of a ‘free Syria’ after overcoming the invisible 
barriers of fear, speaking out for the first time in their 
(SWP), the institute charged with advising the German 
government, briefly became a rallying point for some 
groups within the Syrian opposition, including some 
based in Germany, when it co-convened “The Day After” 
project together with the United States Institute for 
Peace (USIP) in 2012 (SWP & USIP, 2012). With partici-
pants from inside and outside of Syria, it sought to 
offer training by creating working groups on the rule 
of law, transitional justice, security sector reform, 
constitution-making, electoral reform and formation 
of a constitutional assembly, and economic and social 
policy reform. Yet, the initiative ceased thereafter. 
During this process, however, other groups who 
wished to participate were excluded. This concerned 
for instance Syrian Kurdish groups, despite a long 
history of voluntary work in NRW, who were not 
Box 3
The Geneva Peace Processes (Track 1)
Dates:Eight rounds of meetings since June 2012, ongoing
Participants (Track 1): varying
In eight rounds of meetings, the constellation of participants in the Geneva Peace Processes has varied greatly. Meetings ranged 
between being held exclusively by heads of foreign states (Geneva 1), to separate, parallel talks between the UN mediation teams 
and regime and opposition delegations, respectively (except one all shuttle diplomacy; no direct contact) on Track 1.
Where the regime and opposition delegations attended negotiation rounds, it has also changed frequently who constituted the 
officially, internationally recognised opposition. Currently, it is represented by the Syrian Negotiation Committee (SNC), which is 
an umbrella group comprising 58 sub-groups (including the so-called, somewhat separate Moscow and Cairo groups, which are 
seen as comparatively close to the regime). In total, the SNC consists of 134 individual members affiliated with these groups. 
Practically, although it is headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi-Arabia, individuals affiliated with the SNC live all over the world and 
have few opportunities to actually meet and discuss their agenda and strategy. Off the SNC, only between 10 to 15 members on 
average are permitted to be part of the delegation. Lastly, the SNC itself has emerged out of several donor-initiated mergers of 
previous umbrella groups. Accordingly, the Geneva peace processes are characterised by a lack of continuity and often criticised 
for the lack of representativeness, transparency and the influences of external donor states.
Organisation: UN office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria (Kofi Annan (February-August 2012), Lakhdar Brahimi 
(August 2012-May 2014), Staffan de Mistura (May 2014-December 2018), Geir Pederson (December 2018-ongoing).
Proceedings: Depending on military developments in the war, issues discussed have changed with each round, including questions 
of ceasefires and humanitarian access. 
Results: Among its milestones are the Kofi Annan Six Point Plan (March 2012; Syrian-led political process, halt to fighting by all 
sides, humanitarian access, freedom of movement for journalists, the right to assembly and to demonstrate peacefully); the Geneva 
Communiqué (June 2012, among others proposing a transitional government); and UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (December 
2015; transitional government, constitutional reform, elections within 18 months, war against terrorism). Formally, the latter has 
resulted in the newly launched Constitutional Committee in place since November 2019. Practically, the military situation so far 
has not allowed to force compromise on the regime delegation.
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lives, discussing politics openly, experiencing the sol-
idarity of protests, and often feeling as if overcoming 
decades of state repression. Yet for many, this experi-
ence was followed by most painful losses of loved 
ones, their home, of suffering shelling and hunger 
and losing all hopes. To many, the United States and 
other Western states betrayed their alleged ideals of 
supporting democracy, human rights and civilian 
protection when chemical weapons attacks (Obama’s 
“red line”), aerial bombardments of forbidden targets 
in International Humanitarian Law, such as private 
homes, hospitals, schools and bakeries, mass execu-
tions of persons in detention, and the disappearance 
of more than 90,000 persons by the hands of regime 
forces. While external states supporting the opposi-
tion “demanded” civilian protection, they did nothing 
to enforce it while Russian and Chinese vetoes have 
forced a deadlock of the UN Security Council. These 
developments explain a deep sense of fatigue among 
Syrians abroad. Political engagement for changing 
the situation inside Syria to many seems hopeless at 
a time when the regime appears entrenched. Overall, 
there is strong sense that military defeat, continued 
repression and a lack of transitional justice renders 
peacemaking efforts for Syria neigh on impossible, at 
least at the present time. Despite widespread frustra-
tion with official peace processes, newly emerging 
Syrian associations have only just begun to encour-
age Syrians to engage in developing political visions 
for a future Syria.
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In our comparison of their activities on political 
engagement for peace (Chapter 4), we identified three 
levels of engagement: 
1\ grassroots mobilisation: At the grassroots level, both 
Afghans and Syrians committed themselves to 
raising awareness for the wars at home in Germany, 
for example through rallies, lobbying with German 
political parties and parliamentarians and to  
getting involved in initiatives that reach into  
Afghanistan and Syria, as well as into the com-
munity in Germany. 
2\ privately initiated political engagement for peace: This 
has occurred formally organised in associations 
(Vereine) or by individuals on their own. A striking 
similarity that both share is the development of 
networks. Although networks among Afghans in 
Germany appear to be denser, a common charac-
teristic of both is that we do not see the emer-
gence of actual political parties with broad-based 
memberships or feasible, concrete programmes 
for peace and political reform inside Afghanistan 
and Syria, respectively. Notably, this is a phenom-
enon which is not limited to Germany but ap-
plies internationally.
3\ rare top-level engagement in formal peace processes, 
which, however, seems largely disjoint from 
levels 1) and 2). Both experiences show that even 
for persons with a long-standing peacemaking 
engagement, access to official talks (Track 1)  
remains absolutely exceptional, and disappoint-
ment in these official processes and the lack of 
representativeness have enhanced frustration. 
Failures in official talks have meant a setback for 
non-official peacemaking and growing fatigue. 
However, in the case of the highly diverse Afghan 
peacemaking initiatives, these show remarkable 
resilience, especially in the long-term perspective. 
Despite this, we regard the noted fatigue-induced 
shift from a strong political engagement towards 
more developmental—outright non-political— 
activities as alarming. We hold that engagement 
for peace among Afghans and Syrians could 
make a highly valuable contribution towards  
developing politically alternative visions for 
peace in Afghanistan and Syria, respectively.
Among Syrians, engagement for peacemaking 
shows a period of initiatives and hope, especially in 
the early months and years after the beginning of 
protests. Political orientations were diverse, though, 
and most Syrians would tend to keep their views to 
themselves for fear of retaliation if not for themselves, 
then for loved ones inside the country. It appears that 
this atmosphere of fear has significantly impeded 
building wider networks among Syrians in Germany, 
especially across different parts of the opposition. In 
some instances, individuals do join Syrian-led political 
initiatives for peace and in rare cases official talks. 
Overall, the legacy of the Syrian police state and its 
reach abroad continues to render the work of existing 
initiatives that offer forums for dialogue and discus-
sion very difficult. In comparison with Afghan initia-
tives, significant parallels and differences emerge. 
As our historical analysis of Afghan and Syrian 
immigration into Germany has shown (Chapter 3), 
both cases comprise different generations of immi-
gration (Afghans: 1978-1992 [first generation], 1993-
1995 [second generation], 1996-2001 [third generation], 
since 2010 [fourth generation]; Syrians: 1960s-1970s 
[first generation], 1980s-2010 [second generation] and 
2011-ongoing [third generation]). Each of these gener-
ations is distinct from the others regarding their edu-
cational and socio-economic background. Yet strik-
ingly, we find that within each of these generations, 
politically, they are highly heterogeneous and also 
conflictual. A point which Afghan and Syrian immi-
gration to Germany share is that those who are the 
most politically engaged are those who came to  
Germany shortly after the outbreak of war in 1978 
and 2011, respectively. These individuals tend to be 
young and highly educated, often with a university 
degree. Equally in both histories, we find that most of 
their engagement has been carried out in unpaid,  
voluntary initiatives. Yet with prolonged war or the 
re-eruption of conflict, political engagement for 
peace has been followed by severe fatigue. In both 
cases, we find a striking political disconnect between 
generations. 
Conclusion: A comparison of Afghan and Syrian  
engagement for peace 
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Nonetheless, we also find three major structural 
constraints to such engagement for peace, which 
stem from both international and German politics. 
First, activists of the initiatives we have learned about 
in the course of the research process have been de-
nied access to formal peace processes, in some cases 
without further explanation. Indeed, no transparent 
guidelines or criteria exist for who is included or  
excluded in official negotiations. This is problematic 
because in both cases we know of people with rele-
vant constituencies that are deprived of participation. 
Second, the political environment in the country of 
origin, including ongoing war, and challenges in con-
necting peacemaking efforts inside the respective 
country with those abroad impede the emergence of 
broad-based alternative political visions. Third, the 
strong dominance of international interests renders 
peacemaking on Track 1 highly selective and elitist 
despite official claims to inclusivity.
Based on our finding that most Afghan and Syrian 
initiatives originate as private and voluntary work, 
we argue that domestic politics in Germany have 
limited Afghans’ and Syrians’ peacemaking agency  
in the past. For the present, we note that funding for 
political engagement for peace still largely remains 
lacking. Current funding regulations prioritise specific 
issues, such as language classes for refugees, capacity- 
building for skills to integrate into the German labour 
market, etc. Where engagement aims for change 
inside Afghanistan and Syria, it is bound by funding 
available either for humanitarian aid or development 
activities such as infrastructure (re)building or to 
cover basic needs (education and health). In line with 
development and foreign policy imperatives, individ-
uals and particular groups of foreign countries of ori-
gin have been instrumentalised as seemingly unpo-
litical development actors by German politicians, 
agencies and foreign policy.
Taking these insights further, we argue that a 
fundamental part of peacemaking is to foster the 
ability to develop alternative paths for the future 
based on informed worldviews and critical thinking. 
This would enable Afghans and Syrians to engage in a 
Beyond these three levels, we note a number  
of significant differences. First, Afghans who arrived  
after 1978 looked back at mostly illegal political  
engagement inside Afghanistan from 1964 onwards, 
faced threats of persecution from either 1974 or 1978 
onwards but continued to be politically engaged in 
Germany. This included, as we showed, the active re-
cruitment of Afghans in Germany into certain groups, 
lobbying and protest as well as publishing activities. 
Among Syrians, political engagement in Germany, in 
contrast, remains severely impeded by the reach of 
the Syrian police state and decades of repression  
before that. Where such initiatives were founded, they 
are often not connected to long-standing political 
work inside Syria, contrary to the Afghan case, but  
indicate the emergence of new political identities. 
The focus of activities shifted from Bonn—during its 
time as a capital for the first generation of Afghans 
who had come since the beginning of the war—to 
Berlin for Syrian initiatives since 2011. Second, we 
find exceptional cases of broad-based private initia-
tives for peace processes among Afghans in Germany, 
such as the case of Munich—despite the fact that vio-
lent conflict in Afghanistan is in its 23rd year. Among 
Syrians, such a development in Germany has not yet 
been possible.
This said, the analytical insights of this Paper 
demonstrate that peacemaking agency among  
Afghans and Syrians is highly varied and significant. 
However, it has manifested differently. With our ap-
proach of reconstructing history from within, we 
were able to show that peacemaking engagement is 
much broader than scholarship has so far acknowl-
edged. Many of the initiatives we were able to docu-
ment feature remarkable efforts, in which individu-
als invested year- and decades-long voluntary 
engagement in and networking for peacemaking. In 
some cases, this has generated formats with broad 
mobilisation and backing among conflict parties 
such as the Munich Conference in August 2001. How-
ever, these processes have neither been acknowl-
edged by international foreign policymakers, nor 
have their results been integrated into official talks. 
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range of activities, such as political education projects 
which may in the long-term inform the development 
of political programmes for the country of origin and 
initiate reforms in constitutive fields (security sector, 
transitional justice, economics, etc.). In the long term, 
such support will enable more individuals to become 
competent proponents in peace processes. Strikingly, 
throughout both a forty-year-old history of Afghan 
wars and an eight-year Syrian war, the importance of 
supporting independent critical thought, which 
should organically grow out of Afghan and Syrian  
initiatives has still not been recognised, addressed or 
supported by international or German federal or 
state-level policy. Accordingly, as our analysis has 
shown, we currently find very few such initiatives 
despite a high potential visible in voluntary work and 
the commitment of volunteers. Consequently, this  
research reveals that support towards enabling  
autonomous political education from among Afghans 
and Syrians who live in Germany, which is meaningful 
to their respective communities is  lacking, although 
it is crucial. So we propose that support for informal 
and private initiatives for peace should also be sup-
ported in creating dedicated space for exchange and 
interaction among each other, and in cases where 
these are based on significant constituencies either 
abroad or within the country, these should also be in-
tegrated into official peace processes in a transparent 
and systematic manner if they so wish. 
For future research, this Paper proposes that  
politically varied orientations among Afghans and 
Syrians as well as their engagement for peace abroad 
deserve significantly more attention. This applies 
equally to communities from other countries at war. 
On a micro- and meso-level, peace processes entail a 
much wider range of activities—including privately 
initiated processes—that current history writing 
with its focus on official peace processes suggests.  
Especially among communities with large numbers 
of individuals living abroad, political engagement for 
peace could develop significant traction in creating 
alternative, diverse political visions for future peace.  
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AFD     Alternative für Deutschland (right-wing German opposition party) AFD 
BICC     Bonn International Center for Conversion  BICC
CDU     Christian Democratic Union (German political party) CDU
CPSU     Communist Party of the Soviet Union  CPSU
DISASPEACE     Diasporas for Peace DISASPEACE  
FAZA Federation of Afghans and Afghan Students FAZA
GDR German Democratic Republic GDR 
GoA  Government of Afghanistan GoA  
GUAfS General Union of Afghan Students Abroad GUAfS
HIG Hezb-e Islami faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar  HIG
JU Junge Union (youth branch of the German Christian Democratic Party) JU
KNC Kurdish National Council KNC  
KUPFA Komitee zur Unterstützung der politischen Flüchtlinge in Afghanistan KUPFA
 (Committee for the support of political refugees in Afghanistan)  
LCC Civilian local coordination committee (Syrians in Germany) LCC  
NEFA National Unity Front of Afghanistan NEFA
NGO Non-government organisation NGO 
NRW North Rhine-Westphalia NRW
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD
OSULA Organisation for Strengthening of Unity  and Struggle for the Liberation of Afghanistan OSULA
PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan PDPA
PKK Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane,  Kurdistan Workers’ Party PKK
PYD Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party PYD 
SAMA Organization for the liberation of the people of Afghanistan SAMA
SNC Syrian Negotiation Commission SNC
UNSMA United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan UNSMA 
YPG Yekineyen Parastina Gel, (People’s Protection Units) YPG
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